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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the influences, effects and results of
improved life support technologies and of increased medical capabili ties on terminal care and the care of the dying.

It looks at the

results of the application of these death-defying technologies and
their effects on the definition of death, as well as the created need
for new criteria for the determination of death when such technologies
are used.

Some legal, moral and ethical issues raised by these devel-

opments and their application, and the 'new medical problems and

iss u;~ s

resulting from these 'medical successes' are also looked at.
The reasons behind the increasing tendency towards hospitalizing the dying, and death, are explored.

Examination is made of

available alternatives to hospital terminal care.
and/or disadvantages of each are explored.

The advantages

Special attention is paid

to the alternatives available in Australia.
Due to the ever-increasing powers of life-prolonging technologies, many people have come to dread the thought of prolonged
suffering, pain, lingering decline, suspended dying or vegetative
existence.

This thesis looks at the euthanasia movement, which has

articulated these concerns.

It also examines the debate over eutha-

nasia, and the legal, moral and ethical issues that \it raises.
Consideration is also given to some of the positive outcomes of this
movement, such as the tpatients' Bill of Rights•, and the 'Living Will'.
It is argued that intensive technological intervention is
not appropriate at the terminal stage and that the patient should be
able to withhold consent for the use of such technology on him or to
request withdrawal of it if already in use.

The patient should also

be able to choose where and how he ends his days.

In the Australian

context the choice, if available, remains mainly between institutions.
Community support services require a massive upgrading before home
care becomes a viable option.
Finally, on the basis of this analysis, some policy recommendations for terminal care in the Australian context are offered.

'\

\
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INTRODUCTION

We cannot escape the fact that technology has become an
integral part of our social world and an essential element in almost
every field of everyday activity.

The nature and design of the tech-

nology of any soci ety reflects the values of that society or at least
the values of those who are in a position to determine the type of
technology to be implemented.

In other words, the nature of

technology is determined by social, economic and political factors.
As such, it is related to the di.stribution of power;

sustaining,

promoting and reflecting the interests of the dominant social groups
of that society, supporting and propagating their ideology.

The

nature of technology is inseparable from the nature of the social,
economic and political structures which incorporate the forces which
control the complex interactions between society and technology.
Thus Dickson defines technology:
••• as an abstract concept emb-xaacing both the tools
and machines used by society, and the relations

between them implied by their use.

He further defines tools and machines:
••• as objects selected or fabricated by man as a
means of cfianr;ing the state of his materia.._Z environment.
1 *
\. ·

Various models of explanation of technological change have
been proposed.

Some have singled out one or two variables and

attempted through them, to explain such change.

Too heavy an

Dickson, D., Alternative Technology and the Politics of Technical Cha.nge. Glasgow, 1974. pp.16-17.
(*) See a1so Elliott, D. and E11 i ott, R., The Control of Technology.
London, 1976, p.2.
(1)
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emphasis on any one variable in the attempt to explain technological
cha1i0L'. can l ead to determinism.

Such determinism neglects the

interaction of all other variables as they affect change, and limits
the explanation of technological change to the factor singled out as
the sole means of explanation, e.g.:
Technological Determinism;
Economic Determinism;
Political Determinism, etc. 2
On careful examination of each variable, it can be seen that each
plays a part in influencing technological change and that it may
become dominant at some stage.

However, technological change is a

complex process with political, social, economic, cultural and other
factors interacting with technology and vice versa, to bring about
the specific type of change permeating a particular society.

This

thesis is written with such an 1 interactionist 1 model of technological
change in mind.
Medicine has been affected by technological achievements and
innovations, and in turn influenced them, as much as any other institution.

The visible manifestations of these changes are becoming

increasingly obvious.

Until very recently, medicine has been used as

an exemplar of how technological applications and developments bring
only unalloyed good to mankind.

The media and the, yarious
medical
\

foundations trumpeted one historic victory after another.

This

inflated view of how technological medicine helps mankind created bias
in favour of more and more technology and more costly technology.
(2)

Elliott, D. and Elliott, R., The Control of Technology.
1976, pp.1-13.

London,

(ix)
In spite of this increase in technology, little was heard of
the adverse effects of the so-called medical 'advances' and 'breakthroughs'.

Recen t ly, writings which document the limitations of

medical technology have grown.
influence in this area. *

The work of Illich has been of seminal

The lack of objective evaluation of the

results of technological interventions, particularly as compared with
other less invasive treatments, has led Taylor to call contemporary
med i cine "science fiction medicine".

As he states:

There is a preoccupation of medicine with the newly
acquired gadgetry and flashy technology in the face
of meagre evidence as to the usefulness of many of
these methods in diagnosis and treatment.
3

As Illich and Taylor document, technological medicine has
gradually expanded to incorporate all stages of life from birth to
death.

In the area of terminal care, technological intervention has

gradually become the norm, so much so that natural death is no longer
feasible where life-support, life-prolonging technologies are employed.
Under such circumstances people die while comatosed, monitored, betubed,
artificially fed and artificially ventilated.

Death in an acute

hospital is rarely allowed to occur without the last rites of modern
medicine.

Thus, where once death was as natural as life, it has now

become something to be treated, interfered with, technologically postponed.

Death has become a technological event.

\

Technological intervention at the dying stage has challenged
customary definitions of death and has rendered them insufficient and
unsatisfactory.

This has created the need for a redefinition of death

(*) Illich has been criticised by his contemporaries for his technological determinism. In spite of his criticism of technological
medicine, he offers no real viable alternative to it. Reference
to his work is made with awareness of this criticism of him and
without concurrence with his technological detenninism.
(3) Taylor, R. Medicine Out of Control. Melbourne, 1979, p.3.

(x)

and has led to the search for new criteria for determining death.
Life-support machines can maintain traditional signs of life while the
person is 'actually' dead.

Advances in organ transplantation capabil-

ities and a shortage of organs for transplants have added to the need
for new criteria.
The medical tendency to sustain and prolong life whenever
possible has led to increased intervention at the terminal stage.

This

has resulted in unnecessary investigations and treatments, as well ·as
unnecessary pain and suffering for the pying patient. The tendency is
for increased technical care for those patients diagnosed as terminal.
Yet the dying patient is in greater need of intensive caring than he* is
of intensive care.

TERMINAL CARE DEFINED
Terminal care refers to the management of those patients in
whom the advent of death is felt to be certain and not too far off,
and for whom medical effort has been turned away from active therapy
and become concentrated on the relief of symptoms and the support of
the patient and his family.

Most discussions on terminal care are

concerned mainly with mal i.gnant disease, but many of the symptoms to
be treated and much of the general care and management are relevant
to other conditions bringing about death.

'

So terminal care should

not be just a facet of oncology, but of geriatric medicine, neurology,
general practice and medicine in general. 4
(*)

(4)

For ease of expression, masculine pronouns ref,e r to both sexes
throughout this thesis.
Saunders, Dame Cicely, 11 Principles of symptom control in terminal
care", Medicai CZinics of North America, Vol .66, September 1982,
p.1170.

( xi )

Ori ginally, t herapy is di rected t oward inves ti gation and
intervention in order to control and/or cure an i l lness and all ev i ate
associated symptoms.

For dy ing persons, however, t he time comes when

cures and remissions are beyond the capacity of current curative treatment.

It i s then th at the emphasis of in t ervention mus t shift t o

palliative care which is designed to control pain in the broader sens e
and to provide support for patients and t heir families during t his
terminal phase of their illness.

Today, techniques exist to allev-

iate almost all of the discomforts and suffering of the dying.

This

is very rarely a matter of new buildings or expensive equipmen t and
equally rarely is hospitalisation necessary. 5 Palli ative care needs
extensive personal caring and an ordering of the physical and social
environment to be conducive to care.

The patient should not at this

stage be subjected to aggressive treatments that offer no real hope
of being effective and may only cause him further distress and
suffering. 6 However, because of the traditional belief that life
should be preserved and because of the legal sanctions and moral
implications that withdrawal of treatment implies, i t is often difficult for doctors to decide to withdraw curative treatments when death
approaches;

thus many dying end their days in hospital, receiving

treatments that are of little value to them and often not of their
choice.
The work of Dr. E. Kubler-Ross was a timely criticism of
current terminal care pra ctices and has added a new dimension to the
care of the terminally ill.
(5)

(6)

Ker clinical work has motivated many

"National terminal care policy: Report of the Working Group on
Terminal Care", Journal, of the Royal, coiiege of General, Praetitioriers, Vol.30, August 1980, pp.466-467.
The International Work Group in Death, Dying and Bereavement.
"Assumptions and principles underlying standards for terminal
care", Amenean Journal, of Nursing, Vol. 79, February 1979, p. 296.
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care-givers to work in this fi eld and her writin gs and l ectures ha ve
helped ma ke the words 'death' and 'dying' less terrifying.

However,

Kubler- Ross offers no extended critique of current terminal care
t echnology and its social and economic implications.

Her work f ocuses

mainly on the psycho-emot ional aspects of terminal care and t he
failure and inability of the profess i onal carers to meet the needs of
the dying patient in this area of care.
This thesis is an attempt to evaluate some of the implications of hospital-based terminal care technology and to assess it
against the alternatives offered by hospices and home care.

While

some of the economic and social dimensions of terminal care technology
are explored, a full assessment of these is beyond the scope of thi s
thesis.
The thes i.s is organised as fa 11 ows:
Chapter 1 examines the increasing tendency towards the
institutionalisation of death and dying and explores the reasons for
this trend.

It is argued that because of its acute-care nature, the

hospital setting of death inevitably leads to the use of acute-care
technology on the dying.
Chapter 2 examines the subsequent need for redefining death
and the need for formulation of new criteria for the determination of

\

death in the context of modern terminal care technology.

It also

explores some of the legal, moral and ethical aspects of these developments.
Chapter 3 examines the euthanasia debate which has grown out
of the concern over the i:ncreased tendency towards technological intervention at the terminal stage and the fear of suspended dying and

(xiii)

lingering decline as well as the fear of unnecessary investigations
and treatments and their associated pain and suffering.

The issues

of 'Informed Consent', 'Patient's Rights' and 'Living Wills' are
explored in this Chapter.
Chapter 4 looks at the existing alternatives to institutional care of the dying with some comparisons being made between
those alternatives currently available in Britain, the United States
and Australia.

It is argued that home care is a viable alternative

to institutional care, provided that sufficient support services are
made available.

In the Australian context, these services are still

in the embryonic stage and dying at home is not a viable option at
present.
The Conclusion sums up these arguments and offers some
policy recommendations for terminal care in the Australian context.

\

CHAPTER 1

THE INSTITUTIONALISATION
OF DEATH AND DYING

\
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CHAPTER 1
THE INSTITUTIONALISATION
OF DEATH AND DYING

1.1

GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of this century, a trend has become

established of people dying in institutions.

This tendency has shown

a constant increase, so that today, the predominant number of deaths
occur within the hospital.

The hospital was the institution created

by society to support the healing services and it is fundamentally
committed to the recovery process, to curing and to the restoring of
health.

In such an environment, the dying are inevitably perceived

as out of place and, not infrequently, as failures of modern medical
scientific efforts.
Many factors have contributed towards the hospitalisation
trend.

Popular beliefs and reliance on technological gadgetry and

the expectation that, through it, all problems are solvable, has
played a major role.

Increasingly people have been encouraged by

the media, governments, and the medical establishment to believe and
expect that all serious illness can only be managed in hospitals.
By encouraging the perception of dying from any cause as illness, its
hospitalisation became inevitable.

Changing social

~nd ~conomic

patterns and the constantly increasing urbanisation have also contributed to the trend. 1
Death has changed its shape.

The traditional death scene

at home has been replaced with a new one located in hospitals and,
(1)

Doyle, D., 11 Domiciliary terminal care 11 , The Practitioner, Vol .224,
June 1980, p.575.
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more rarely, in nursing homes or hospices.

Gene rally dea t h comes

from chronic rather than acute i llnesses.

In hospital s it arrives

in a lonely room, without family or f ri ends around, but with the
dying surrounded by and connected to numerous wires and tubes, a11
aiming at keeping death at bay;

what is achieved instead is to kee p

at a distance any human contact.

The loss of personal integrity now

often occu rs long before biological death.
death any more.

Patients do not meet

Death comes to them while comatosed, betubed, vent-

ilated, narcosed, sedated, intravenously fed;
not even human any more.

not while conscious ,

Hence, where once dying was not a mat ter

to be decided upon, but an accepted event, it has gradually become
something to be hospitali sed, treated, interfered with, avoided,
technologically postponed.

1.2

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
It is easy to forget that the need for sheer physical

survival still prevents the majority of mankind from having a primary
concern for the suffering involved in dying.

In nations where

survival is a constant battle and institutionalised care is of the
most basic form and for the most serious of conditions, views on
death are markedly different from those in the modern technological
world.

\

this century;

haunted by famine, epidemics and high levels of infant

and child mortality.
decades.

.

The people of Europe were in similar circumstances before

The average life span rarely exceeded four

Under such circumstances, not many could afford the luxury

of worrying about the possibility of suffering at the end of their
1 i fe.

- 3 -

The easing of material circumstances in western societies
has brought a decrease in early deaths and in mortality overall, and
a reduction in physical suffering.

These dramatic improvements have

been attributed more to improved nutrition, better living standards,
sanitation and water supply, than to medical treatment. 2 Affluence
changed life and death considerations.
consider death and suffering.

Man could now afford to

In addition to a new awareness of

suffering at the end of life, which is no longer accepted as inevitable, the present concern for the way in which people die has been
heightened by the fact that dying has changed so drastically with
advancing techniques in modern medical care. 3

1. 3

THE ILLNESSES FROM WHICH PEOPLE. DIE
The illnesses from which people die have changed in rela-

tive importance since the turn of this century.

One of the most

significant changes since 1900 has been the decline in major
corrmunicable diseases as leading causes of death.

There has been a

consequent increase in relative importance of (a) the new diseases
of civilisation and affluence;
degenerative diseases;

and of (b) dying from chronic and

the latter oq:urring mainly later in life

and thought to be associated with the ageing process.
\

In the early
.

period of life, the advent of the special care nursety has had its
impact, with many more children surviving now, no matter how sickly~
(2)
(3)
(4)

Webster, I.W. "Social implications of institutional health
care", New Doator, No.27, March 1983, p.5.
Taylor, R. Medicine Out of Control. Melbourne, 1979, p.18.
Illich, I. Limits to Mediaine. Harmondsworth, 1976, p.83.

- 4The fact that death now not only stems from degenerative
disease, but also comes much later in life* is of increasing concern
to people.

Cardiovascular and cerebrovascular disease, the latter

commonly accompanied by degeneration, are becoming increasingly corrrnon
before death.

As a result, the fear of dependency and, more so, the

fear of senility, have come to accompany the fear of a long, slow, at
times undignified and possibly painful death.
Coronary heart disease was almost unknown in the early 1900s.
Now it is the main cause of death in middle and older aged men and in
elderly women in most western countries. The expensive technological
attack mounted by the medical establishment against this disease has
little evidence to show that it has had any more than a marginal effect
on mortality. 5 Illich pre~ents evidence to show that there is no
advantage, and argues that:
... the higher mortality of those benefited by
mechanical care in the hospital is usually
ascribed to fright.
6

Yet more resources, human and technological, are in ves ted in this area
of care than are channelled into any other aspect of disease prevention or treatment.
The medical establishment has become progressively accustomed
to asking for and getting the newest available technologies for use,
'

often prior to any evidence as to their effectivenes~ or. risks, and
more often without any consi.deration of any possible alternatives.

(*)

In America, the average life expectancy was around 40 years at the
turn of this century, and has risen to 70 years along with most
European countries. However, there has been no increase in the
life expectancy of males 30 years and over in OECD countries since
1950 (In Taylor, op.cit., p.18}. Accidents and the new diseases
of civilisation seem to have had a stabilising effect (Illich,
op.cit., p.89).

(5) Taylor, op.cit., note 3, p.21.
(6) Illich, op.cit., note 4, p.114.

- 5 -

The tendency to treat symptoms rather than to actually prevent the
cause has become the common practice.

An example of such a recent

technological development is the surgical technique of coronary bypass grafting.

A lengthy and costly operation, it is presented to

those patients considered as suitable candidates, as the solution to
their problem, often with no offer or suggestion of alternatives or
optional methods of management, which could be equally effective,
less costly and less traumatic.

At a critical time, of great fear

and apprehension, when the patient is in a most vulnerable condition,
relying on his doctor for his care, he finds himself in a no-choice
situation.
In a recently-published Melbourne study, the cost of a
coronary by-pass graft was estimated at $5,000 in 1980 prices.

The

procedure had a survival rate of eighty-seven percent after five
years.

An increased return to tull-time work was noted and fifty-

five percent of the patients were free of angina post-operatively.
This was a basic cost and did not take into account capital cost,
equipment depreciation, cost of investigation or post-operative
follow-up;
didates.

nor did it include investigation costs of unsuitable canThe cost of these was not given, so it is hard to estimate

the 'real' cost of each operation.

Yet the authors feel that an

expensive operation that returns the person to work inay be economically preferable to invalidism and social support.

Deeply-rooted

cultural attitudes and western values become apparent.

Physical

vitality, independence, success, are valued and sought-after attributes.

Dependency, physical or economic, is viewed as undesirable

and not cost-effective.

The authors agreed, however, that

- 6 -

preventive measures could reduce the cost of all forms of therapy
most effectively. 7
The question here is whether society can afford to spend
hundreds of thousands of dollars on ' saving' few lives, while other
areas are being sadly neglec t ed.

The amount of investment socie ty

allows could be taken to reflect social attitudes towards this area
of care.

The dilerruna is in choosing who has access and on the basis

of what criteria?

An equally difficult task is deciding what the

cost of a human life is in the area of resource allocations, and
whether society is justified in allocating vast resources to preserving few individual lives while denying these resources to more
general health objectives.

The Federal Minister of Health,

Dr. Blewett, feels that politics, power and money have become th e
central issues in the health care debate, and it is these that determine the outcome. 8 ' 9
Cancer ranks amongst the corrmonest causes of death.
Though much can be done for many forms of cancer, cancer still
remains a dreaded disease because of its often fatal outcome and its
progressive pervasive body erosion that leads to loss of control of
basic body functions and dependence on others for bodily care.

This

occurs while the patient is conscious, and thus feeling very humili\

. · 10

ated, and always in fear of ending his days in great pa1n.
(7)

Rosenfeldt, F.L., Lambert, R., Burrows, K. and Stirling, G.R.
"Hospital costs and return to work after coronary bypass
surgery", Medical JoUl"YLal of Australia, Vol.I, March 19, 1983,
pp.260-263.
(8) Dr. Blewett on A.B.C. Science Programme, 24th April, 1983.
(9) Dr. Blewett, "Technology robbing basic health care", The
Australian, April 25, 1983, p.3.
(10) Williams, G. "Euthanasia and the physician", in M. Kohl (Ed . )
Beneficent Euthanasia. New York, 1975, p.147.

7 -

The fear of t hi s des tructi ve disease has
by the med ical estab li shment .

bc~ n

seized upon

Its propaganda, propaga ted by t he

medi a as 'breakt hrou ghs' and 'medical advances ' has led to beli efs
that great progress is being made in the treatment for cancer.
Taylor cites Greenberg's fin dings where he examined the National
Cancer Institute's statistics and concluded that, in the two decades
from 1950 to 1970, there was very li t tle improvement in the su r vival
rates for cancers.

Taylor also points out that the review of da t a

of untreated breast cancer patients concluded that survival ra t es
were not markedly different from those pati ents treated by surgery
and with or without drugs and radiotherapy.

Because of this, the

treatment of breast cancer, the most common cause of cancer death s
in western women, is presently in a state of flux. 11
However, in spite of data suggesting little improvement in
survival rates, cancer treatment and research is one of the f as t es tgrowing specialties.

This led Taylor to state:

The role of modeT'n therapeutic medicine in coping
with this disease has been vastly overemphasised.

12

Cancer is a very emotive issue and because of it, very successfully
manipulated by those with vested interests, be it lobby groups,
researchers, the medical establishment, those with financial investments in its technology, or hospital administrators seeking new units
or new equipment.

(11)
(12)

Taylor, op.cit., note 3, pp.23,30
Ibid., p.32.

\
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1.4

THE NEW LOCATION OF DYING
The greatest changes have occurred and are still occurring

A

in the location and circumstances under which death takes place.

variety of reasons are perceived as having contr ibu ted to this trend.

At the turn of the century, most Britons and Americans died
in their homes.

By the late 1950s this had changed to fifty percent

of Britons and sixty percent of Americans dying in hospitals and homes
for t he aged. 13 By 1980, the American figure had risen to eighty
percent 14 , while in England, up to sixty percent of the rural deaths
and up to seventy percent of urban deaths were institutionalised. 15
These figures give some indication of the increased tendency towards
institutionalising death and dying.

In Australia, since the begin-

ning of the century, people have felt that death should occur in
hospital unless it came too quickly and suddenly to allow transfer
there. 16

1.5

THE REASONS FOR THE INSTITUTIONALISATION TREND

I.5.1

Changed Perceptions of the Hospital Function
This interesting trend has been explained by some as due to

a change in the perception of the function of the hospitals.

'

In

.

earlier days, people entered hospital to die, so hospitals were
avoided.

As medical advances made cures possible, the hospital began

to be viewed as primarily an acute-care setting, for short-term care
(I3)
(14)

Doyle, op.cit., note 1, p.575.
Behnke, J.A. and Bok, S. The Dilemmas of Euthanasia. New York,
1975, p.11.
(15) Ahmedzai, S. 11 Dying in hospital: The resident's viewpoint",
British Medical Journal, Vol.285, September 11, I982, p.713.
(16) Gates, G.R. "Terminal care in country practice", Austmlian
Family Physician, Vol.II, May 1982, p.339.
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and cures.

People seeking cu res began to enter more readily and of
course those not cured or curable died there more often. 17 Thus the
hospital gradually began to be perceived as the appropriate place for
the management of terminal illness and of death.
The situat ion today is that the majority of people , for
various reasons, do not die at home:

some because their treatment and

ca re can only be met in hos pi ta 1 ; others because home ca r,e is not
poss i b1e or avai 1able;

and others because they enter for inves t-i ga-

tion or trea tment and never improve enough to l ea ve.
1. 5.2

Socio-economic and Cultural Reasons
This constant and great shift in the location of dying has

been further encouraged by technological advances in medical care and
by

a host of social, cultural and economic reasons.

With increased

urbanisation, a much higher proportion of people live in small homes
or units with no extra room for a sick room.

A greater number of

women are now working, so often there is no-one to care for the sick.
The family unit has shrunk; many elderly live alone;

if any rela-

tives exist, few are willing to care for their sick and even fewer
feel that they could possibly manage. 18
Because now death comes much later in life, people only
witness death or care for the dying at a much later stage in their
life.

Also, with longer lives and many people dying in institutions ,

immediate contact with death is less frequent so the would- be carers
become more reluctant to undertake the responsibility and are more
( 17)
(18)

Kalish, R.A.
The aged and the dying process: The inevitable
decisions". In H.D. Schwartz and C.S. Kart (Eds.), Dominant
Issues in Medical Sociology. Reading, 1978, p.538.
Doyle, op.cit., note 1, p.575.
11
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inclined t o request institutionalisation of their dying. 19 Very often
the dying themselves, not wi shing to be a burden to the family, and
with little ot- no community support, seek institutional care as their
only choice.
1. 5. 3

Changing Medical Practices and Public Expectations
Changing public and medical attitudes and expectations have

also affected the institutionalisation trend.

In our servi ce-oriented

soci ety, in creas ingly people have been seeking outside help to alleviate the difficulties of care of their dying.

Of course, the

medi ~~ 1

establishment, by managing terminal illness and dying under the
medical model of disease, has given the impression that death and
dying can only be managed in institutional settings with its solutions
to be found in the available technology.

Hence the institutionalisa-

tion - especially the hospitalisation of the dying - has acquired its
prime justifi cJtion.

Only under medical care, in an institutional

setting, can everything possible be done to sustain life and delay,
hopefully avoid, death.

So public expectation and pressure demand

that death take place in hospital if it can be arranged.
are rarely given a choice:

The dying

"They are in the best place for all they

could 'Wish and need, and i ·t is to their benefit".

20

Death inevitably follows terminal illness.

\

Because a high

percentage of deaths from terminal illness occurs in institutional
settings, it has been mistakenly assumed by the medical profession
that all dying patients are terminally ill.

The natural changes of

ageing that bring about the end of life have been turned into
(19)
(20)

Hinton, J. Dying. Harmondsworth, 1972, p.13.
Kobrzycki, P. 11 Dying with dignity at home 11 • American Journal
of Nursing, Vol.75, August 1975, p.1312.
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pathological events, trea tdb le on ly with modern medical tech ni ques ,
but, alas, not curable!!

The med i cal i sat ion of dy i ng

medical practices, and in Ameri ca fear

n1us

chang i ng

ui

li ti gatio n, ha ve g1,eatly

contributed to the hos pitalisation trend.

As docto rs lose some of

the i r expe r t i se and experience in managing te rminal care in t he home ,
they feel insecure in their ab ility to manage and become rel uc ta nt t o
undert ake the responsibility.

Also, with t heir changing percep ti on

of i,.1ha t requires investigati on and treatment, the hospital cho ice
comes more easily.

As community medical and nursing skills in

terminal care are either lost or not developed, those choosing to die
at home find themselves in the hands of inexperienced carers and are
more likely to face difficulties and more suffering, 21 a situation in
many ways similar to current obstetric practices and the home birth
movement.
The public fascination with hi gh technology is no less
entrenched when it comes to health care expectations.

Increasingl y

people have shown a reliance on technology and an overestimated
expectation of what it can do.

They accept technology, expecti ng

solutions to their problems through it, even when they know that there
is no solution.

They place high hopes on what they believe the

doctors have and can achieve through the application of medical technology.

They prefer hos pi ta 1s, expecting hos pi ta 1i sa ti on to a11 evi ate

their suffering, reduce their pain;
way they will live longer. 22

in fact, people think that this

The perception that serious illness can only be managed in
hospitals is a belief propagated by the media and encouraged by the
(21)
(22)

Doyle, op.cit., note 1, p.582.
Illich, op.cit., note 4, p.111.
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medical establishment and governments al i ke.

This belief l ed people

to seek hospitalisation for all illness perceived as serious.

As

more illness becomes hospitalised, and as more condition s of li fe
become medical i sed, so the quest for more res ou rces grows, as we 11 as
the demand for more and newer technologies to meet newly-created needs .
An increasing percentage of health funds is allocated towards life
extension technology for terminal patients.
available, must be used.

This technology, once

As more resources are directed into t he

terminal care technology, more dying people are encouraged to believe
in and to seek a technologically-managed death in the institutional
setting.

For many, the hospital stands as the symbol and guardi an

of health.

As they seek the hospital and the use of its t echnology,

they make themselves dependent on it.
normal event, or their own death;
event".

Their death ceases to be a

it becomes instead a "technologi cal

23

Terminal Care as an Investment Opportunity

1. 5.4

Health care delivery follows the dollar, and that dollar is
heavily invested in the institutions where high technology attracts
most people.

The preoccupation of the people in most western tech-

nological countries with health and longer life has given the impetus
to pushing ahead in the search for ways and means of prolonging life.
\

The demand is for better and more care and more years to live.
Stupendous sums of government and investors 1 share money are being
put into the fight for longer life. *
(23)

Ibid.

(*) That
poor
many
more

much of this is wasted because of inefficiencies and that
dietary patterns and poor life-styles are more to blame for
health problems does not seem to count in the rush to throw
millions at health care.
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Investmen t op por tunit i es abo und i n t he health sector in
America, where investors have been advised to look into this area for
investment because of the projected growth.

This is based on t he trend

of a r apidly ageing popul at i on and the known expecta ti ans of the
.
peop 1e. 24
Amer1can

The private sector of heal t h care investmen t i n

Australia is not dissimilar to this.
As more investment is put into terminal care and life ext ension te chnology, greater use of it is expected and encouraged.

The

medical belief that it is the doctor's puty to save lives, irrespective of economic, moral, family, personal or social impact, encoura ges
the use of all available means.
Thus those dying, whether from old age or other causes,
become prime candidates for the extensive and ex pensive ca re mounted
by

the medical establishment in order to prolong life.

But with such

intensive care comes also a lonely death.

1.6

EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONALISATION ON THE DYING

1.6 . 1

Isolation - Loneliness - Fear
The shift from dying at home to dying in institutions has

greatly increased the loneliness of the patient and his estrangement
from his familiar surroundings, his family, friends ·and relatives.
Patients writing or speaki.ng of their experiences, emotions and perceptions of their care in institutional settings, speak of fear,
anger and depression, loneliness, helplessness and loss of control
of t he situation and of their own life.
(24)

Feelings of anguish and

Newton, M. "Health shares beat market ills
August 9, 1983, p.11.

11
,

The Australian,

1
-

ii
.L"1

-

alienation from family, friends and staff are also mentioned.
and nurses are seen as terribly
.

to th e dy1ng .

bad

Doct ors

communicators, who avoid tal ki ng

25

A dying patient may fear th at he wi 11 be subjected t o pain-

f ul and uncomfortable

proc~ du res

desirable quality of life.

that may prolong existence but not a

He may fear the unknown or that he may be

abandoned once curative measures become useless.

The dying tieed the

comfort and reassurance that they will not be left alone and need to
be secure in this knowledge.

But for the doctors and nurses of the

acute care hospital, terminal care is an area they are not interested
in, nor one in which they choose to work.

For this reason, it is

important that these professionals come to grips with the fact that,
when they are caring for the dying, they are no longer concerned with
saving a life, and that the priority in this case is on providing a
good death without needless procedures and suffering.

It is, of

course, very difficult for them to accept the philosophy of caring
and treating with a view to death. 26
In a hospital, the dying person is isolated physically and
emotionally.

He is surrounded by biased systems of communication,

in a social setting that gives very low priority to the dying, his
individual personality and inner feelings and experiences.

His care

is delivered in an environment which is seriously de~ici~nt emotionally.

In hospitals, much effort is directed towards denial and

evasion.

Many doctors still believe that the dying or terminally

ill do not wish to be told, so they do not tell the patient the truth.
(25)

(26)

Dunea, G.
Writing about dying British Medical Journal,
Vol.280, 21st June, 1980, p.1520.
Mclver, V. A time to be born - a time to die The Canadian
Nurse, Vol.76, September 1980, p.41.
11

11

,

11

11

,
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This makes it very difficult for nurses, partL;ularly if they feel the
patient should be told, so they avoid the patient.
Ours is a death-denying society.
no exception.

Doctors and hospitals are

Death is an event to be camouflaged, hidden from view,

denied, evaded and avoided.

So, as death approaches, patients are

moved into single rooms, preferably closer to the door.
is easier to remove the body from the ward. 27

From here it

At a time when the

pati en t most needs people around him, he is isolated from them.

The

fact tha t he is dying removes from him his attributes and rights as a
living person.

This, and the evasion of his impending death by the

profess ionals, are the first steps towards isolating him in hi s own
loneliness, fears and
1.6.2

anxieti~s.

The Failures of the Professionals

Care givers constantly fail to understand the needs of the
dying patients.

The much-publicised work of Elizabeth Kubler-Ross,

who has developed a conceptual framework for understanding the process
of dying and our ways of dealing with death and dying, has been a
major contribution in thi.s area.

But her stage theory,* when inter-

preted by well-meaning but inexperienced professionals, predisposes
to an approach of putting the dying th.rough these stages, until the

ultimate acceptance occurs.

They fail to remember, .or

~hey

do not

\

know, that the emotions of the dying patient ebb and flow and that
not all dying people reach the final stage.
(27)
( -1- 1

There is much evidence

Kingsbury, K. I want to IJie at Home. Heidelberg, 1980, pp.13- 14.
Kubler-Ross has described the five stages which may occur when a
person is dying: initial shock and numbness, the patient's denial
of his impending death, his anger, his willingness to bargain for
more time, depression, and preparatory grief and sometimes final
peace and acceptance. A common misconception about these stages
is that they will occur in the sequence described. Kubler-Ross,E.
On Death and Dying.
New York, 1969.
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to show t.ha t several other factors i nf1 uence t he behavio ur and ex periences of t he dyi ng .

The nature of th e disease , the pati ent's

ethnic backgrounrl , the personality, maturity and life-s tyl e of the
dying, age, religi on . envi ronment an d soci al si tuation, al l have their
28
influence.
Pati ents shou l d not be made to conform to the i dea l ised
pattern upon which many professionals seem to have come to rel y as
. own coping
. mec han1sm.
. 29
par t of th e1r
Studies show that both doctors and nurses tend to avoid the
dy i ng patients.

The doctors often, if hard pressed for ti me and i n

order to attend other pati ents more hopeful in t erms of

recove ry~

may

pres cribe life-sustaining t echniques, knowi ng they wi ll not provide a
cu re, simply because they do not have the time and because "teffllinal
30 Sometimes this onsl aught of
patients t end t o be a law priority".
technology is a

fa~ade

for denying the truth and fa cing t he inev itabl e.

Generally nurses experience guilt and embarra ssment i f
caught in conversation with a patient.

Nurses tend to avoi d dying

patients, either because they have become too involved to be su pportive, or because they are unable to handle the situation at all.

In

an environment that emphasises investigation, cure and life maintenance and prolongation, the expertise and outlook of staff are in
mismatch with the dying patient's needs. 31 In this type of
\

environment, nurses become caught up with the techni cal aspec ts of
patient care:

monitoring them;

checking devices;
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)

taking and recording observations;

all of which suddenly become all-important and

Feigenberg, L. Terminal Care. New York, 1980, pp.13- 14.
Greene, P.E. "A nurse specialist view 11 , in O. J. Sahl er (Ed.),
The ChiZd and Death. Saint Louis, 1978, pp.175-176.
Ahmedzai, op.cit., note 15, p.713.
Kingsbury, op. ci t., note 27, p.18.

- 17 time-consuming, so that if the patient wishes to talk they appear
constantly busy and so avoid personal contact. 32 This is mostly due
to discomfort and not knowing what to say to a dying person or his
relatives, who are under a great deal of stress, which the staff do
33
not seem to notice.
Yet, when dying is talked about openly, staff
become less reluctant to talk to the patient and no longer avoid hirn~ 4
The patient, even though he sees through all this, respects
the unwritten rules of the institution and, not wishing to be
considered out of line or a trouble-maker, conforms to the non-verbal
request that he 1 keeps quiet'.

At the same time, he bottl es up panic ,

fear, guilt and other emotions arising from this situation.

At a

time when he should be working towards a peaceful death, he is
surrounded by denial and evasion. 35
1.6. 3

Mechanisation and Dehumanisation of Dying
All these contribute to the 1owe red sense of meaningful

humanity characterising the end of life in the institutional setting.
The dehumanisation is increased by the electrical wiring, the tubes
for intravenous fluids, the monitoring machines and electronic devices,
all of which aim at delaying death;

at least until doctors, nurses

and the family have satisfied themselves that they have done all they
can and have exhausted all available means of trying ,to avoid, prevent
or postpone death. 36 Then the patient can die, and if he is a good
patient, he dies without too much lingering on after permission has
been given and all have come to expect his death!
(32)

Balon, P.A. "A staff nurse's view", in O.J. Sahler (Ed.), The
Saint Louis, 1978, p.163.
Murray Parkes, C. "Home or hospital? Terminal care as seen by
surviving spouses", Jou:rnaZ. of the Royal. College of General
Praatitioners. Vol.28, January 1978, p.27.
Kobrzycki, op.cit., note 20, p.1313.
Mclver, op.cit., note 26, p.38.
Simpson, M.A. "Planning for terminal care", The Lanaet, Vol.2,
July 24, 1976, p.192.
Child and Death.

(33)

(34}
(35)
(36)
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All the mechani sdtion, the unfamiliar and impersonal
surroundings, sleep deprivation from frequent observi'\tions and disturbances, coupled in the dying with the fear and

prospe~t

of death, can

lead to what has been called 'the intensive care syndrome',
ized by acute psychological dnd behavioural disturbances. 37

~11 : ~c ter

Such

distress may be worth enduring if cure is in sight, though it could
hardly be justified; but for the dying patient these aids create the
distance, distress and suffering without providing any cure.

In fact,

they often become the chosen substitute for the difficult-to-offer,
comforting human care. 38
Medical technology is usually beneficial in the care of the
acutely sick or injured persons, sometimes dramatically so.

Not

everybody agrees, however, on the extent of the measures which should
be taken to keep death at bay.
every possible fragment of life.

Some believe it is a duty to preserve
The medical establishment strongly

supports this line, but others think that an excessive zeal to delay
death can make the possible become senseless. 39
An increasing number of body functions, vital and otherwise,
can be maintained by machines, mechanical respirators, cardiac stimulators, artificial kidneys, and other .ingenious devices.

No-one

doubts their importance when used for the acutely ill, to support them
in a crisis, so helping them survive to return to re~son~ble health. 40
It is these positive outcomes and the human hope of avoiding the
inevitable that feed the desire to seek and use all available medical
technology.
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)

Nevertheless, such technology is often intrusive,

Behnke and Bok, op.cit., note 14, p.11.
Balon, op.cit., note 32, pp.163-164.
Hinton, op.cit., note 19, p.141.
Duff, R.S. "Guidelines for deciding care of critically ill or
dying patients", Pediatrics, Vol.64, July 1979, p.17.
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sometimes cruel and for the terminally or incurably "ill, it is of
l ittle or no value.

Hence its use t o prolong a very limited form of

life in such persons is increasingly being questioned.

There is

little justification f0r i ts use and it can ca use distress to the
fam1· 1y. 41
In hospitals today there needs to be considerable thought
before initiating the use of life-support technology, pa rticularly
when there is little hope of future recovery.

It is a problem that

cannot always be considered at lei sure ,.especi al ly when emergency
resuscitation machines are called for, and that if used, can be
regretted for a long time afterwards. 42 When a state of suspended
dying has been achieved, disconnection of support machinery is a
disturbing procedure.

Yet it has never before been possible to ha ve

patients of this type, who are the results of the successes of modern
medicine when it is used thoughtlessly. 43
Since most of the care of the dying takes place in acute
hospitals, where much scientific apparatus is used to aid di (1 y11osis
and treatment of remediable condit ions, the likelihood of it not
being used on terminally ill or dying patients, at least initially,
is quite low.

Complex diagnostic tests, and distressing and inef-

fective therapeutic intervention are not what the dying need.
Neither do they need intensive care technology, but require more
intensive caring, though it is more co!Tlllon for them to receive good
quality technical care, while their needs as living persons are
neglected, because they are dying. 44
Hinton, op.eit., note 19, p.141.
Duff, op.cit., note 40, p.19.
(43) Scott, R. The Body as Property. London, 1981, p.149.
{44) Hinton, op.eit., note 19, p.157.
(41)

(42)
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Of course, the commitment t o hea ling and curing and the

sense of fa ilure that dying leaves on one, act as strong incentives
for the p10fess ionals t c. mobil ise all resources and to employ all
known diagnostic and therapeutic means "in a:n all out effort to avoid
45
failUl'e by delaying death 11 •
This is an aspect of wh at Taylor would
ca 11 "med-i cine out of control". 46
1.6. 4

The New Look for Meeting Death
The burning question is:

What extent of technological

intervention does the medical establishment consider justifi ed wh en
death ·is inevitable ?

People no longer depart in dignity, but in a

welter of failed measures, betubed, monitored. artificially fed and
Jrtificially ventilated, excreting via tubes and catheters and looking
anything but human beings.

Our death-denying culture further adds to

the impetus of this massive effort to face death in such an unrecognisable face.

Wh ether it really is necessary to do all this to a

dying human being so that the survivors will not feel guilty is
something that every professional that can exercise power over decisions in this line of action, should ask himself every time he finds
himself considering more treatment and more tubes.

',

\

(45}

Mauksch, H.O. "The organisational context of dying 11 , in
E. Kubler-Ross, Death the Final Stage of Growth. New Jersey,

(46)

Taylor, op.cit., note 3.

1975, p.7.
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CHAPTER 2
REDEFINING DEATH

2. 1

INTRODUCTION
In modern medicine, the focus of attention has been on t he

postponement of death, originally through µrevention and eradication
of disease, but more recently through th e development of impressive
life-saving techniques and technology .

The growing powers of medi -

cine in prolonging life brought with them new and difficult problems.
Advances in sophisticated l1 fe-support machines have reached th e
point where t h patient can die only if the life-support machines are
turned off.

This has opened up a whole new area of problems in

relation to the dying process, the dying person, the meaning of life
and death, the criteria used in determining that death has occurred,
medical initiatives in living and dying, and the extent to which lifemaintenance efforts should be pursued .

These problems are not only

medical but also fundamentally moral and ethical, economic, political,
legal and social in nature.
Life-maintenance technology created the macabre situation
in which the body lives while the brain is dead.

Thi s , and the wide-

spread use of procedures in organ transplanting, being two areas of
major developments in medical technology, have led directly to
concerns about defining death.

As a direct result of new medical

capabilities which can sustain the traditional signs of life in the
severely ill and injured, death has become difficult to determine as
the following definitions from various sources indicate:

- 22 Permanent cessat·ion of the integrated functioning
of the organism as a whole . 1
Irreversible cessation of spontaneous
and/or circulatory functions. 2

respirato1~

Irreversible loss of spontaneous brain functions
Irreversible loss of the ability to respond
or communicate. 3
The cessatZ:on of life; the ceasing to exist;
defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the
cii•culation of the blood, and a cessation of the
animal and vital functions consequent thereupon. 4

2.2

DISCUSSION
Death is not what it used to be.

as it has been assumed to be in the past.

It is not as identifiab le
Death was a phenomenon

known to the ordinary observer through the visible and palpable manifestations of the cessation of respiration and heartbeat.

The

development and use of sophisticated machinery to artificially maintain
both circulation and respiration has rendered doubtful the significance
of these traditional 'vital signs' of pulse, heartbeat and respiration
as indicators of continuing life.

Death can and does occur in persons

whose hearts are beating and whose blood is circulating.

It is thus

no longer possible to assume that the determining of whether and when a
person has died is a relati ve ly simple matter.
The issue of prolonging life creates the awesome responsibi lity of deciding the moment of death and of letting people die. 5 Even
more awesome is the decision not to resuscitate.
(1)

Such decisions need

(2)

Kass, L.R. "Death as an event in R.F. Weir (Ed.), Et hical Issues
in Death and Dying. New York, 1977, p.73.
Capron, A.M. and Kass, L.R. "A statutory definition of the standards for determining human death", in R.F. Weir (Ed.), Ethical
Iss '/,,./Es in Death and Dying. New York, 1977, p.113.

(3)

Ibid.

(4)
(5)

In D.R. Cutler (Ed.}, Updating Life and Death. Boston, 1969, p.58.
Hinton, J. Dying. Harmondsworth, 1972, p.143.

11

,
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to be taken in advance if they are to be of any valu e.
need to be made on an individual basis.

They also

Where the law recognises the

wishes of the individual, this is made easier.

The actual resuscita-

tion situation requires speed, leaving no time for deliberations.
Without previously-made decisions, reactions of the moment can be
regretted for a long time later, in view of the severe brain damage
and the suspended dying imposed on the patient.

This is usually the

case if resuscitation is attempted or continued after 'heart death',
when the normally following period of a few minutes before brain death
is prolonged into hours or even months. 6 In such cases, by allowing
the continuation of intensive medical attention upon a corpse, great
injustice is being done to the patient, his family, the professional
carers, other sick patients and the community footing the bill. 7 The
controversy that arose with the Karen Ann Quinlan case in America
focused attention on the issues involved and their implications.
Switching off the machine to allow the process of dying to
continue can, under the circumstances, be regarded as abandonment of
heroic attempts to restore life.

In Britain, as the law stands at

present, failure to institute life-saving measures might, depending
on the circumstances, constitute culpable negligence. 8 In the
Australian State of Victoria, proposed legislation aims to give
terminall ~ 1

ill or fatally injured persons a choice and a say as to

whether their life should be maintained by life-sustaining procedures
and to the medical practitioners, immunity from liability for any act
done in pursuance of this declaration, without negligence and in good
(6)

(7)
(8)

Walton, D.N. On Defining Death. Montreal, 1979, p.9.
Scott, R. The Body as Property. London, 1981, p.145.
Campbell, A.V. Moral Dilemmas i n Me di ~ine . (2nd Ed.) Edinburgh,
197 5' p. 170.
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faith. 9

In South Australia, it is now legal.

Persons over eigh teen

can direct removal of life supports if t he illness i s t erminal and
would result in death had no life-support ma chines been us ed. 10 *
Most doctors, faced with the problems of suspended dyi ng of
doomed patients kept alive by mechanical devi ces, almost hope fo r an
infection that will put an end to their dilemma.

The intertwining of

the ethical problem of letting-die with that of defining death and t he
connection of both with the technology of artificial ventil ation, is
concisely expressed in a 1974 Lancet Editorial:
The doctor's di lerrona about brain death ari se s only when
patients are put on ventilators , and it i s therefore of
his own making.
When a pati ent who already has severe
brain damage develops respiratory insuffi eiency or
cardiorespiratory arrest, careful thought should be
taken before artificial respiration i s extended beyond
the immediate resuscitation period.
Prolongation of
such a patient's li fe ... reflect s no credit on his
doctors, particularly if this is done only so as to
postpone the de cision to l e t events take thei r natural
course. It would be unfortunate if the time came when
no patient in hospital could di e without t he l as t r i t es
of modern medicine - a statutory per i od on the ventil ator.
11

Traditionally, doctors, nurses, and the public believed that
when a life could be saved there were never any trade-offs.

However,

while technological achievements have helped solve many problems of
how to save lives, they have al so created the problem of when to stop.
In recent years, improvement in resuscitation

proced~res

and develop-

ments in life-support technologies have resulted in an increasing
number of patients accumulating in hospitals who can be kept alive
(9)
(10)

(*)

(11)

In Hospital and Health Care Australia, Vol.10, October 1983.
Section on 11 Government 11 , p.7.
A.B.C. Nationwide, November 28, 1983.
See Appendix lA for the 'Living Will' i ssued by the Voluntary
Euthanasia Society of Victoria.
Walton, op.cit., note 2, p.104.
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only by extra-ordinary means and for whom there is no hope of
12
recovery.
These are problems directly attributable to medical
success.

They are becoming widespread, affecting all of us.

They

are practical problems with financial implications and must begin to
13
be seen as such.
Where the so-called 'human vegetable' was once
an infrequent problem in terminal wards of hospitals, it is now
becoming a common problem. 14
The problem of suspended dying can create confusion and
uncertainties that can have far-reaching ctnd distressing consequences.
Many social institutions, arrangements and practices depend upon a
clear notion of whether a person is still alive or not.

At stake

are matters pertaining to homicide, burial, family relations, inheritance and, above all, the legal and moral rights possessed by, and
the duties owed to, a living human being. 15
Increasingly the longstanding legal definition of death has
been questioned as to its adequacy.

Black's Law Dictionary defines

death as:
The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined
by physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation
of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital
functions conse(r·r-mt thereupon such as respiration,
pulsation, etc.
(4th Ed., 1951) 16

This assumes that the criteria for determining death are settled and
not in doubt among physicians.

This is no longer the case, partic-

ularly since modern resuscitative and supportive measures are used.
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)

(16)

Capron and Kass, op.cit., note 2, p.104.
Walton, op.cit., note 6, p.l.
Hoffman, R. 11 Death and dignity 11 , in M. Kohl (Ed.), Beneficent
Euthanasia. New York, 1975, p.77.
Task Force on Death and Dying of the Institute of Society,
Ethics and the Life Sciences. 11 Refinements in criteria for the
determination of death. An appraisal 11 • In R.F. Weir (Ed.),
Ethical Issues in Death and Dying. New York, 1977, p.91.
11
A defini.tion of irreversible coma. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School 11 • In D.R. Cutler (Ed.),
Updating Life and Death. Boston, 1969, p.58.
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In an effort to clear up the confusion and to provide the
necessary guidelines, alternatives have been proposed.

These offer

specific procedures, criteria and tests to aid the doctor in determining whether the patient has died.

These proposals have been

widely discussed, by doctors un d the public, and while they have
gained acceptance in some quarters, they have also stimulated considerable controversy and criticism and at lime, public disquiet.
greatest concerns are the prolongation of life and suffering;

The
that

the medical profession, via the control of life technology, controls
the time of death;
these circumstances.

and that patients die only when allowed to under
Above all is the concern that death may be

pronounced more readily if the dying person is a potential tran splant
donor.
The most widely accepted criteria for determining death are
those formulated by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School,
under the chainnanship of Dr. H.K. Beecher.

The Committee's primary

purpose was to define irreversible coma as a new criterion for death.
The Committee gave two reasons as to why there was a need for it:
(1)

Improvements in resuscitative and supportive measures
have led to increased efforts to save those desperately
ill, with sometimes only partial success.
in individuals whose heart continues to
brain is irreversibly damaged.

This results

be~t,

but whose

The burden is then great

for the family, the hospital and those in need of the
already-occupied beds.
(2}

Obsolete criteria for the definition of death can lead
to controversy in obtaining organs for transplantation. 17

(17)

Ibid., p.55.
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These new criteria go beyond the traditional standards of
permanent cessation of heart and lung functions, without discounting

them.

They are set to deal with cases where life-support machinery

is in use.
(1)

They are essentially the following:
Unrecepti vi ty and unresponsivity:

Total unawareness

to extern a1ly applied stimuli and complete unresponsiveness.
(2)

No spontaneous muscular movements or spontaneous res piration.

After the patient is. on the respirator, the

total absence of spontaneous breathing may be established
by turning the respirator off for three

(3)

minutes.

(3)

No reflexes, including brain and spinal reflexes.

(4)

Flat electroencephalogram (EEG).

(5)

All of the above to be reverified after 24 hours.

(6)

The patient must not be hypothermic (temperature below
32.2°C) or under the influence of central nervous
system depressants. 18 , 19
The condition is to be determined only by a physician.

Death is to be declared and then the respirator turned off.

This

1atter point a11 ows for the obtaining of organs for transp 1an ta ti on.
The Harvard criteria called for detailed verification of
all the criteria, including EEG.

\

If all the tests showed negative

responses, this would confirm irreversible loss of brain function
and the pa ti en t' s death. 20 As a resu 1t of the debate that fo 11 owed
the publication of the report in the Journal of the American Medical
( 18)
(19)

(20)

Ibid., pp. 56-58.
Walton, op.cit., note 6, p.30.
Scott, op.cit., note 7, p.159.
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Assoc'iation ( JAMA ) in August 1968, the EEG cri terion dropped from

favour.

Other sets of criteria were formulated, such as those of

the University of Minnesota Health Science Center, which place more
emphasis on clinical judgement and do not require EEG reading. 21
But the Harvard criteria prevailed.
Soon after the Harvard Report appeared in

JAfoJA,

the 22nd

World Medical Assembly in Sydney, Australia, proclaimed the Declaration of Sydney.

The Declaration drew attention to the changes in

diagnosing death brought about by artif,icial life-support machinery
and advances in organ transplantation.

It also emphasised that death

is a gradual process with different tissues and cells dying at
different times:
But clinical interest lies ... in t he fate of a
person...
Determination of the point of death
of the person makes it ethically permissible to
cease attempts at resuscitation and in countries
wher e the lC11U permits, to r emove organs from the
cadaver.
22

The need of transplant teams to obtain organs in good condition from cadavers has stimulated the search for tests that would
permit the death of the organism as a whole to be declared before the
constituent organs have suffered extensive deterioration.

This has

given rise to public disquiet, with many people expressing concern
that their organs are not removed while comatosed from treatable
\

conditions.

It has also prompted comments from ethicists, theolo-

gians, lawyers and others, 111any of whom feel that for a redefi ni ti on
of death to be acceptable to the majority and morally justifiable,
it must have the dying person's interests at h,e art and as a primary

(21)
(22)

Walton, op.cit., note 6, p.31.
Scott, op.cit.~ note 7, p.159.
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concern, and not those of another sick person.

For example, Ramsey

argues that the focus on a new definition should be so that:
... those who have died need not have life sustai ning
measures inflicted upon their unburied corpses needlessly and at great expense to their families.
23

These reasons should be sufficient in themselves.

Any benefit that

may accrue to other patients must be an independent by-product.

The

issue should be resolved as though transplantation did not exist.
Unless the two are treated apart, Ramsey feels that the medical profession could be accused of the desire to pass from the spectacular
treatment of the dying and indeed of the dead, to the spectacular us e
of borrowed organs. 24

Cadaveric organ use is an issue that Fletcher

does not perceive as unsavoury when he argues against the waste of
human tissues and organs from the dead that could be used to restore
health to the living, if only man could overcome his culturalreligious resistance to the idea. 25
Both the acceptability of brain death as a standard of
death and the criteria to be used (usually the Harvard criteria or
something very much like them) have found their way into statutory
laws in some countries, such as Italy and Switzerland, and State
statutes in the United States of America, with the Kansas Statute
being the first in 1971.

In America, a general acceptance followed
26
which led to the Uniform Brain Death Act in 1978. \ It states:
This Act expresses community approval of withdrawing
extraordinary life support systems when the whole
brain has irreversibly ceased to work.

and the definition is:
(23)
(24)

(25)

(26)

Ramsey, P. "On updating death", in D.R. Cut'ler (Ed.), Updating
Life and Death. Boston, 1969, p.53.
Ibid.
Fletcher, J.
0ur shameful waste of human tissue", in
D.R. Cutler (Ed.) , Updating Life and D1x1th. Boston, 1969, pp.1-30.
Scott, op.cit., note 7, p.161.
11
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For legal and medical purposes, an individual with
irreversible cessation of all functioning of the
brain, including the brain stem, is dead. 27

Thi s allows the traditional criteria of cessation of blood circulation ,
brea t hing and heartbeat to be used if required.
Accepta nce by means of legislation has taken place in Canaud
where the laws are brief, recognising brain death and eliminating
\

liability for those doctors involved .

In Britain, it has received

support by the Medical Royal Colleges, which hav made the criteri a
very strict, but legislation is not forthcoming. 28 In Australia, the
0

Australian Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons has adopted the
British method and criteria of determining brain death.
Wales, legislation is before Parliament at present.

In New South

This will recog-

nise death as the "irreversible cessation of brain function ".

It

also aims at simplifying the procedures for obtaining human tissues
after death, particularly when a pe rson had not specifically expressed
a wish to that effect. 29
In Victoria, legislation has been introduced givi ng doctors
wide powers, allowing the removal of body tissues for transplant,
through the Human Tissue Bill. 30 Donor cards are also being sen t
out with drivers• licences in an effort to enhan ce this. 31 *
( 27)

(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)

(*)

Ib1:d.
Ibid. , pp.160-162.

Totaro, P. "Government prepares transplant laws", Sydney Morning
Hera ld, March 31, 1983, p.11.
"Victoria sets body transplant rules", Sydney Morning Herald,
October 14, 1982, p.1.
Lynch, P. "New donor club cards to accompany driving licences",
The Weekend Australian, April 9-10, 1983, p.4.
See Appendix 2 for a sample donor card, circulated by the
Australian Kidney Foundation.
1

1
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Scott feels that harder dec isions lie ahead.

As it becomes

easier to maintain circulati on and nutr·ition by mechanical means,
people who are brain dead could be used in their vegetative existence
for a variety of experimental and research purposes, such as immunological research and drug testing.

Their medical training

contribution would be invaluable and they would provide a continuous
source of hard-to-come-by human body components and by-products.
Blood and organs are already being used. 32 Fletcher, however ,
believes that technological advances will make these, or at least
some of them, unnecessary. 33

2.3

IN CONCLUSION
Modern medicine, in its desperate attempts to save human

life through modern technology, has generated a self-inflicted crisisj
that of not knowing when to pronounce someone dead, and when to cease
providing medical attentions to a corpse.

Thi s has forced the need to

produce the entity of brain death : first, to aid doctors in deciding
when to stop treatment, and to protect them from litigation and,
secondly, to make legally possible the removal of organs for transp1an tat ion.

In spite of widespread acceptance, people are still

concerned that their organs may be removed while comatosed from
treatable conditions, or that they may be pronounced ' dead earlier if
they are potential organ donors.

Hence the definition of the concept

of brain death was seen as necessary to facilitate transplantation
work, but also to assure the public that:
(32)
(33}

Scott, op.cit., note 7, pp.163-165.
Fletcher, op.cit., note 25, pp.22-23.
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... no organ transplants will be performed, unlesc
the clinical, ethical, human and moral requirements
have been satisfied. 34

In New South Wales, proposed legislation for tissue transplantation
established a new definition of death, that of "total cessation of
all brain function", and permits doctors to remove organs without

risking the possibility of legal action. 35

By

this definition,

\.

Karen Ann Quinlan would be declared alive, having not lost all brain
function.

(34)
(35)

Walton, op.cit., note 6, p.8.
Hospitai and Health Care Austratia, op.cit., note 9, p.7.
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CHAPTER 3

THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE

3.1

INTRODUCTION
Technological capabilities in the health care fie ld have made

it possible for the health professi onals to offer cures or alternatives
but in terminal care such alternatives are between dying now or dying
later.
Prolonging life and the infliction of unnecessary suffering
when the prognosis is hopeless and death is known to be unavoidable, is
a costly practice for the patient, the family, the health care givers
and society at large.

The value of it has been increasingly questioned,

since the costs are not just economic.

Cri tics have raised many

questions and many people are searching for their answers.
such as:

How far should doctors go in delaying death?

Questions

Which of the

many techn iques on prolonging life can they, in good conscience, omit in
caring for terminally ill patients?

When is it justifiable Lo withhold

or withdraw treatment in order that a patient may be allowed to die?
What can patients and doctors do in cases wh re a conflict exists
between prolonging life and easing suffering?

Is there anything a

person can do before becoming a patient, to decrease the chances of
'\

.

being reduced to intolerable levels of investigation and suffering,
loneliness and dehumanization?

The answers are not easy for the

doctors, and for the patients they are even more difficult.

The sanc-

tions against failing to treat are still greater than those for overaggressiveness.

The doctors find themselves drawn in more than one way.

Their self-perception as healers encourages use of all available
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technology to sustain life;
the search for cures;

as scientists, they invoke investigation i n

but as carers and comforters of the dying, when

curing is no longer possible, they are at a loss.

The dying pati ent is

perceived as a failure of healing and medical science, and doctors fi nd
it difficult, if not impossible) to confront their failures.
The constitutional right of privacy includes the right to
refuse treatment, but on the issue of euthanasia and of hastening deat h,
that right has been questioned.
seek their own death?

Should human beings have the right t o

If so, under whµt conditions?

assist them in dying, and if so, who?

hould others

Or should such death be

prevented by religion, by law, or by anyone capable of intervening?
The arguments for and against are many.

Active euthanasia is

seen as killing, in contrast to passive euthanasia, which involves
letting die by 'omission to save'.

A marked division of opinion exists

concerning the issue, which is of special significance in medicine.
Many doctors acknowledge engaging in pas$ive euthanasia, a practice
supported by the Church and society and acceptable legally.

However,

the question of when a patient may be permitted to die must be di stinguished from the question of what a doctor may intervene directly to
terminate the life of a patient.

The difference is sufficient to lead

some ethicists to conclude that euthanasia is never justifiable.
\

The distinction between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia
raises the central issue of informed consent and the question of who
should take the responsibility for such consent in cases of (i) infants
who now survive since the advent of modern special-care nurseries, and
(ii) of comatose patients who cannot speak for themselves?

The answer

is increasingly taken out of the doctor-patient-family triad and sought
in the courtrooms and legislative chambers.
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The thought of involuntary euthanasia i s associ ated wi th
compulsory euthanasia programmes and is used as an ar gument by those
objecting to active voluntary euthanasia.

However, even if euthanasia

is justified on moral grounds, the legalisation of it is a separate
matter.

So far, attempts to legalise it have met with fail ure, in

contra st to attempts to

pa~s

legislative Bill s , which would grant

adults the legal right to have life-saving treatment stopped, whi ch met
with more success.

3.2

THE MEANINGS OF EUTHANASIA
The term 'euthanasia' originates from the Greek

good and Thonatos: death.
meanings:

a good death;

an incurable disease;

E'u,

meaning

Its definition encompasses the following
a painless putting to death of persons having

an easy death;

also, mercy killing. 1

The term originally meant a good death, a painless and happy
death, with no reference to whether such a death was indticed.

Even tu-

ally a second meaning began to prevail, so that euthanasia now generally
means "an act or method of causing death painlessly so as to end
suffering".

2

Thus euthanasia has come to be synonymous with a painless

and deliberately foreshortened process of dying, and increasingly it has
come to be equated with mercy killing.

'

\

In active euthanasia, an agent - usually a doctor - administers
a death-dealing agent that kills the patient.

(1)

(2)

The New Grolier Webster lntep;iational JJictionapy of the 'English
Language, Vol.I, New York, 1972, p.339.

Dyck, A.
"Beneficent euthanasia and alternative views of mercy",
in M. Kohl (Ed.), Beneficent Euthanasia, New York, 1975, p.lHL

Terms commonly used are:
(i)

(ii)
(iii)

Active vs. Passive Euthanasia;
Voluntary vs. Involuntary Euthanasia; and
Killing vs. Letting Die, denoting the legal terminology
for Active vs. Passive Euthanasia.

A 11 RIGHT TO DIE 11 vs. "QUANT ITY OF LIFE"

3.3

The decision to end life is the final expression of the moral
right to

be

free, 3

a

right that Illich feels that the patient has lost

through the medicalisation of life.
die on his own"

"'11ie patient's unwillingness to

has made him pathetically dependent on the doctor and

made the "l'ight to be professionally killed into a maJ°or issue". 4
Euthanasia is thus an issue that became important only since terminal
care has been medicalised.

Its contemporary contentious status is thus

the direct outcome of the growing technological dependency of t ermina l
care.
More and more frequently, doctors and nurses have been expected to mak,e difficult decisions concerning the choice between life

and

death, or between life which is worth living and life which is hardly
preferable to death;

choices about which there are deep disagreements

and uncertainties, but choices that increasingly have been expected of
them because of the complexities of modern medicine. ,
\

For many people, personal integrity is more important than
biological survival.

Yet in the realm of medical care, the sanctity of

life has had priority at all costs.

When one is asking:

What is

preferable - quantity or quality of life? one is also asking:

Can we

any longer morally accept the principle that in medical care we are
{3)

( 4)

Bertram & Sandman, E., "Rights, justice and euthanasia", in M. Kohl
(Ed.} Beneficent Euthanasia, New York, 1975, p.94.
Illich, I., Limits to Medicine. Harmondsworth, 1976, pp.110-111.
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always obliged to prolong life as much as the available means ma ke
To say 1 yes 1 is to assert that quantity is more important,

possible?

but to say 1 no 1 is to accept that quality comes fi rst.
believes the latter, and states:

Fletcher

'We should drop the classical sanc-

tity of life ethic and er!Wrace a quality of l1:fe ethic instead".

5

Thus, in considering prolongation of life, a major point to focus upon
should be whether this can add to quality or simply quanti ty, and at
what costs:

physical and mental suffering of the patient and family;

social, economic and other concerns of society must also be taken into
account. 6

A great number of people dread the thought of prolonged
suffering and pain, a lingeri ng decline, or a vegetative existence.
Their fears could be much reduced if they knew that they were in the
care of a doctor who shares their views and would not needlessly strive
to keep them alive.

However, these days most people die in hospitals, 7

in the care of doctors that they very rarely know well, and thus they
are very unlikely to have that sort of understanding. 8 Patients know
that doctors differ in their attitudes to active vs. passive euthanasia
and more and more people feel that the best way of securing a dignifi ed
death is to make their own arrangements, not relying on the doctor,
their luck, or even upon nature.
With the institutionalization of death, the dying became
dependent on the professionals.

After several decades of full depend-

ence, people are beginning to re-assert the right for self-determination
(5)
(6)
(7)

(8)

Fletcher, J. "The right to live and the right w die", In M. Kohl
(Ed.), Beneficent Euthana.sia. New York, 1975, p.46.
Williams, R.H. (Ed.) To Live and to Die: When, Why and HOUJ.
New York, 1974, pp.87-88.
Ahmedzai, S. "Dying in hospital: The resident's viewpoint",
British Medical Journal, Vol.285, 11th September, 1982, pp.712,713.
Campbell, A.V. Moral Dilemmas in Medicine (2nd Ed.), Edinburgh,
1975, p.16.5.

-

··n
.)<J

-

in death, even to the extent of removing death from the hospitals.
This is a move that is hardly surprising at a time when more people
are demanding greater say in their medical treatment and care.

The

suicide guide, entitl ed A Guide to Self Del,i verance, and distributed
by the British Voluntary Euthanasia Society (now EXIT) has been seen
by

some as an in termediate stage in the campaign for self-determination

on death. 9

3.4

THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE
As indicated above, euthanasia is a very controversial

signifying to some, literally, a 'good death', while to others
nifies a morally outrageous death.

To

issue~

it

sig-

some it means any steps to

hasten the dying process, whether actively doing something, or simply
by the decision not to start,or to stop a medical treatment, so that
the dying process can continue.

To some, certain omissions are

considered the same as euthanasia, while to others certain ac tions are.lu
The issue of actively hastening the death of a dying patient
as against pas s ively letting the patient die has been widely debated.
The former point designates acts in which one does something directly
to end life when it would otherwise go on, while the latter designates
acts in which one refrains from doing something so that death will come
more quickly.

The question of whether a

differenc~\exi~ts between

actively aiding a person 1 s death and letting him die through omitting a
remedy, when his death is intended in both cases and comes about in
both, has become a major issue in the euthanasia debate.
(9)

(10)

What is

Philosophically speaking 11 • Editorial, Nursing Mirror, Vol.151,
September 18, 1980, p.12.
Barton, D. (Ed.), Death and Dying: A e ZinicaZ guide for care
givers. Baltimore, 1977, p.159.
11
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central to the issue is whether there is a difference between an act
of corrmission and an act of omission.

Those who use the outcome as

the criterion would argue that there is no difference between them.
Thus Fletcher argues:
This seems a cloudy and tenuous distinction; either
way the intention is the same, the same end is willed
and sought and the means used do not justify the ends
in one case if not the other. 11

However, Ramsey takes the view that:
. . . the difference between only caring for the dying
and acts of euthanasia is the important choice
between doing something and dbing nothing.
In
omission, no human agent causes the patient's death
directly or indirectly. He dies his own death.
12

Passive euthanasia involves refraining from doing something
that could prolong or save a human life, for reasons of compassion.

In

letting die, the agent's motivation is to refrain from doing something,
thus letting the dying process continue.

This is a legally acceptable

act, fostered by religion and public attitudes.
What is legal, however, is not always ethical and similarly,
what is morally justifiable may not be sanctioned by law.

Therefore,

whether it is moral or not to actively kill the dying patient for mercy,
there is a clear legal distinction between active killing and simply
letting die.

Since active euthanasia involves actively and intention-

ally killing the person, it is clearly illegal.

Being
active and
\

having the distinct element of intention for a specific outcome, that
of death, under the present laws it is murder.

The ethical reason of

compassion does not enter into this legal definition.

But in spite of

it, only rarely have doctors been prosecuted for committing euthanasia
(11)
02)

Fl etcher, J.

"Elective death", in G. Fu 11 er-Torrey (Ed.),
Ethical Issues in Medicl,ne. Boston, 1968, p .148.
Ramsey, P. The Patient as Person. New Haven, 1970, pp . 151-152.

- 40 -

and even then

tilE:y

have been acquitted, usually on

th i-'

')rounds of

t inu1ng
• •
I
•
I
•
t 1ng
•
th e same. 13' 14
•
discon
ex t ra- or d1nary
measures or omit

This shows the clear-cut reliance by the courts on the medical corrununity and the general tendency to place such moral decisions in the
doctors 1 h:, nds.

It mi ght be argued that this refl ects the powerful

position of the nied1cal profession in our :.:. ociety and the control they
have over definitions of health and illness, not to mention life and
dea th definitions and their ethical and mora l implications.
For the person who is inevitab ly dying, refusal of

treatrrn~n t

seems much easier to jus tify, when there is si mply nothin g more that
medical science can do to serve the interests of that person, but for
a person who could go on living if treated, the judgement involved is
much more qualitative.

In the case of the dying person, to continue

treatment is to impose a useless burden on the patient, while not
serving that person 1 s interests in any significant way.

The questions

are how far a doctor should go in hi.s efforts to prolong life and
whether all that medical science can offer should be done prior to
doctors ceasing treatment, and withdrawing life-sustaining measures.
In the latter case, the decision could be either to treat or not to
treat, depending on which principle of medical ethics one uses.
Barton 15 lists four different principles and shows how each would
influence the decision to treat or not to treat.
(13)
(14)

(15)

B~~efly,

these are:

Meyers, D.W.
The legal aspects of voluntary medical euthanasia",
in J.A. Behnke and S. Bok (EdSJ The Dilerrunas of Euthanasia. New
York, 1975, pp.60-61 .
"Bond for suicide assist"rnce", Sydney Morning Herald, April 15,
1983, p.2.
This article refers to the Larkin case in Melbourne ~.hic h appears
to have followed similar lines, acquitting Larkin on the grounds
of enormous stress, and placing her on a good behaviour bond.
Larkin, a nurse, had administered insulin to assist Mr. Pick to a
dignified death.
Barton, op.cit., note 10, pp.159-161.
11
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(1)

The Hippocratic principle:

The emphasis here would

be on doing what is thought to serve the i nterests of
the patient.
(2)

The quality of life principle:

This makes de cisions

harder, since the judgement could be arrived at that
some lives are not worth living - a conclusi on not in
accord with the fourth principle, and strongly opposed
socially, by law, and by religion.
(3)

The social benefitting principle:

A dangerous and

troublesome principle that allows the interests of one
person to be traded against the interests of another.
(4}

The right to l ife principle:
to 1i fe for a11.

This supports a right

What seems not to have been resolved

here are the lengths to which one goes in ensuring that
right.
From the Roman Catholic point of view, since the use of modern
techniques on patients with hopeless outlook is a treatment that goes
beyond the ordinary means to which one is bound, it cannot be held tha t
there is an obligation to use them. 16 But the professional view is
that it is better to err on the side of active treatment since it can be
at times difficult to deterrnrne what 'extra-ordinary measures• are.
Yesterday's extra-ordinary techniques are today's routine.
However, at some po·i nt doctors have to stop staving off death;
but the crucial question ts, at what point?

When a doctor thinks that

the expected benefits do not justify the amount of suffering inflicted
on a patient, particularly when treatment prolongs life but does not
(16}

Hinton, J.

Dying.

Harmondsworth~

1972, p.142.
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cure or ameliorate the condition, then the doctor may refrain from
continuing or initiating a treatment. 17 But he may also not do so,
if uncertain of the prognosis.

It is then that the dying person endures

unnecessary suffering and the burden of suspended dying, because treatment is not curtailed.

It is over this point that the euthanasia lobby

has campaigned to introduce the right of the patient to exe rcise a

choice , and to direct withdrawal of 'extra-o rdinary' means of life
maintenance.
Arguments in Support of Euthanasia

3.4.1

Those who believe in euthanasia insist that it is morally
obligatory to respect the pati.ent's wishes and withdraw life-sustaining
measures, particularly when such people have expressed the fear of being
kept alive by machines and requested tennination of life under such
circumstances, in which case there is no obligation to ~uve such life. 18
The legal acceptance of 'The Living Will' accepts this principle, and
allows for withdrawal of extra-ordinary means if the person requests it.* A
The supporters of this view argue that, as more and more
people are being kept alive by life-support machines, there will
and more patients maintained in a vegetative existence.

be

more

The use of

modern technologies becomes problematic on many accounts.

Does one use

them on all, and if so, are there enough for all?

who comes

off a machine and who goes on?
come off?

~f n~t,

Who decides what happens to those that

Are they to be left to die?

The active euthanasia propo-

nents would argue that letting die can be worse than intentional killing,
since it intentionally condemns someone to suffering and to a long,
(17)
(18)

(*)

Steinbock, B. Killing and Letting Die. New Jersey, 1980, p.9.
Brandt, R. 11 A moral principle about killing 11 , in M. Kohl (Ed.),
Beneficent Eut"hanasia. New York, 1975, pp.110-111.
See Appendix IA and lB.
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lingering, painful death, as compared to a good death by euthanatic
means.
There are, of course, those who would argue that active
euthanasia is kindness and since society and its members have an obligation to treat each other kindly, in certain circumstances there is a
moral obligation to induce death;
so. 19

it is in fact seen as a duty to do

The critics of this idea would ask:

If it is pennissible to

allow mortally ill people to die, why should it be necessary to wait
for the disease to bring them close to the end? Why should not euthanasia be made available earlier? 20 Or even to others with continuous
suffering, but who are not termi.nally but perhaps chronically ill?
t

3.4.2

Arguments Against Euthanasia
Those opposing euthanasia would insist that it is important

to society's ethical code that we do not end human life.

A dogmatic

prohibition is necessary to act as a bulwark against erosion of our
value of others• lives.
from culture to barbarisr11;

They argue that euthanasia is a reversal
it is against the traditional Christian

teaching of the value of human life and against the great western
Christian tradition that has never sanctioned the killing of the
to
innocent. 21 Welty goes on to defend this absolute ,opposition
\
euthanasia with the argument that:
It is not God's wiZZ, and it is neither permitted to
us mortals nor indeed possibZe for us to strip death
(19}

(20)
(21)

Kohl, M.

"Voluntary beneficial euthanasia", in M. Kohl (Ed.},

Beneficent Euthanasia. New York, 1975, p.135.
Hinton, op.cit., note 14, p.146.

Sullivan, J.V.

"The immorality of euthanasia", in M. Kohl (Ed.},
Beneficent Euthanasia. New York, 1975, p.29.
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of all its terror and pain; death is meant to be
t he last and greatest test we have to undergo here
22
on earth.

The possibilities of abusing euthanasia have also been
as arguments against it.

u ~c d

But the greatest abuse of all, as seen by

those opposing euthanasia, is that of the 'wedge principle', that
legalisation makes possible.

The wedge principle refers to an act

that would injure humanity if raised to a general line of conduct and
as such it is wrong, even in an individual case.

Hence Sullivan states:

Euthanasia must not be admini·stered, for to permit in
a single instance the diriect killing of an innocent
person would be to admit a most dangerous wedge that
might eventually put all life in a precarious condition.
23

The argument continues and makes the point that, once permitted, there
is no way of stopping the advancement of that wedge.

If voluntary

euthanasia were legalised, there is good reason to believe that, at a
later date, another Bill would legalise compulsory euthanasia.

This

would lead to killing off all incurable patients, charity patients, the
aged, the deformed, the mentally afflicted.

The Nazi holocaust is

inevitably evoked by those using this argument.
Therefore, according to this view, euthanasia is never kindness and is misapplied when used to justify killing. 24 This is in
spite of the fact that many have pointed out that the Nazis never
.

\25

engaged in mercy killing, but in merciless genocide.

(22)

(23)
(24)
(25}

Welty, E. A Handbook of Christian Social Ethics, Vol.II,
Edinburgh, 1963, p.130.
Sullivan, op.cit., note 21, p.24.
Cuskelly, C. "Voluntary euthanasia is a kindness to the tenninally ill", The Lamp, Vol.37, February 1980, p.15.
Fletcher, J., op.cit., note 5, p.137. ·
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3.5

THE POSITION OF THE MEDICAL ESTABLISHMENT
Members of the medical profession generally reject the idea

of euthanasia, seeing their role as that of healing and prolonging life
rather than ending it.

However, as more and more critics are alleging,

doctors cannot always cure and there are times when prolonging life is
of questionable value and can be seen as prolonging dying.

It would

therefore appear that the medical rejection of euthanasia is based less
on logic or sound professional reasons and more on economic and utilitarian reasons, such as the

maintenanc~

of their traditional role and

position of power, the maintenance of their image and of public
confidence.

The traditional conception of the doctor's role is that

of 'loving care' and 'doing everything possible' in the final stages of
life.

From the medical point of view, a change in that conception

could have adverse effects on the doctor-patient relationship and the
doctor's image. *
Thus, the main objection of doctors to legalisation of active
euthanasia appears to be the fear that they, by admitting to it even in
the most justifiable cases, may be branded as killers and suffer loss
of public confidence.

This is a fear that Williams, a doctor himself,

sees as ill-founded.

He believes that patients would feel more secure

with the doctor in the knowledge that they would not be forced to
remain a1i ve "'in some horrid parody of life"·

26

\

Barton goes further, to say that active euthanasia would
change the doctor's role, but maybe it should, so that doctors could
This is not to say that doctors at all times ensure that nothing
they do or say reflects badly on their image. For example,
doctors have shown li:ttle concern regarding the effects on their
image of deliberately deceiving their patients in front of relatives who may be patients themselves one day.
(26) Williamss. G.
Eutb.anasia and the physician", in M. Kohl (Ed.),
Beneficent Euthana.sia. New York, 1975, pp.148-149.
(*}

11
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actively kill for mercy. 27
The American Medical Association (AMA) clearly rejects the
intentional termination of life, while allowing under certain conditions, passive euthanasia.

The Association states:

The inten tiona l termination of the life of one hwnan
being by another - mercy killing - is contrary to
that for 1.Jhich the medical profession stands and is
contrary to the policy of the A.M.A. The cessation
of the employment of extra.-ordinary means to prolong
the life of the body, 1.Jhen there is irrefutable evidence that biological death is imminent is the
decision of the patient and/or his immediate family.
The advice and judgement of the physician should be
freely available to the patient and/or his immediate
family .
28

Generally, members of the medical profession acknowledge
engaging in and supporting the idea of passive euthanasia, while
rejecting that of active euthanasia.
the same opinion.

The public seems to be

al~o

of

In one study, 80 percent of the doctors and lay

persons favoured passive euthanasia.

Twice as many medical students
favoured active euthanasia as did doctors. 29 In a 1973 poll, 37 percent of lay persons thought that the terminally ill patient with no
cure in sight had the right to tell the doctor to put him out of his
misery, while 53 percent thought it was wrong. 30

The doctors' self-

perception as healers and the legal status of euthanasia were major
factors affecting their attitudes.

In a study, 59 percent of the

doctors said that they would act upon request to wit,hdraw treatment
if they were sure it was legal, but only 27 percent said that they
would positively hasten death if it were legal. 31
(27}

(28)
(29)
(30)

(31)

Barton, op.cit., note 10, p.151.
Quoted in Steinbock, op.cit., note 15, p.70, by Steinbock.
Williams, R.H. "Propagation, modification and termination of
life", in R.H. Williams (Ed.), op.cit., note 6, p.94.
Barton, op.cit., note 10, p.161.
Brown, N.K., Bolger, R., Laws, H., Thompson, D.J., "The preservation of life", JAMA, Vol.211, 1970, pp.76-82.
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Traditionally , t he doctor- pati ent rela t ionship has been 011e
where the do ctor is in the pos i ti on of power as the holder of information and of the means of treatment, while the pa ti ent is at t he
powe r less receiving e11d . 32 To accept situations where th e pati ent i s
in a position to choose and di ct ate th e t erms of t reatment or l ack of
i t, would be to acce pt a reversal of thi s t ra ditional doctor- pati ent
power rel ationship, which could pose a threat to and create uncerta i nty
and insecurity in the doctor who i s not l i kely t o have been prepared
for such a situation.

It could be a strong enough reason fo r the

profession as a whole to object to such a change.
Thus, in responding to the Karen Ann Quinl an case, McCormi ck
wrote in an Editorial in

JAMA:

The medical profession should be t errified at t he
possibilities hidden ••• The Quinlan case should
never have gotten to the aoUl"ts.
The real moral
issue is not merely a narrowly considered one about
the limits of our duty to sus tain life ••• It is
the very moral matrix of the healing profession •••
that roots in the conviction that decision making
within health care, if it is to remain truly hwnan
and an expression of the cardinal rule of the
physician, must be controlled pr'l r·n rily within the
patient-doctor-family relationship ••• If technology and law were largely to usurp these pr er ogatives
••• we would all be worse off • • • That is always the
root of oppression and depersonal i sation.
33

Recently in the United

Kin~dom

and America, several mecha-

nisms which 'bring the patient more directly into
process have been proposed.

th~
\

decision making
.

The 'Living Will' is a model letter,

authorising the withholding of heroic measures and artificial means
of sustaining life in the event of a terminal condition.

It does
not authorise active killing, but it eliminates heroic measures. 34
(32)
(33)
(34)

Waitzkin, H.B. and Watennan, B. The Exploi tation of I llness in
Capitalist Societies. Indianapolis, 1976, pp.76-77.
McConnick, R.A. "The Karen Ann Quinlan case", Editorial, JAMA,
Vol.234, December 8, 1975, p.1057.
Barton, op.cit., note 10, p.167.

- 48 -

I ts critics object to it because they argue it is not known whether
the patient could have changed his mind since the Will was s igned . *
In order to facilitate the 'right to die' and 'death with
dignity', some States have introduced pieces of legislation to that
effect.

This excludes active euthanasia, but allows tenninally ill

patients to order their doctors to put an end to artificial lifesustaining efforts. 35

The first State to introduce such legislation

in Australia is South Australia, where persons over eighteen can
direct removal of life supports if the illness is terminal and would
result in death had no life support technology been used. 36

3.6

CONSENT
A central question in the euthanasia debate is whether or

not consent is necessary and/or a sufficient condition.
Amongst those who believe that acts of euthanasia are permissible and morally justifiable, some see fully infonned and freely given
consent as a necessary condition and that the consent must be given by
the individual concerned, and it is not transferable. 37

Others

believe that consent or request by the person concerned should be a
sufficient condition for making euthanasia morally and legally permissible if the person is competent and voluntarily co~ent_s.** 38
above does not allow for those who cannot express consent.
person suffer simply because he cannot express consent?
(*)

(35)
(36}

(37}
(**)
(38)

The

Must a
There are

See Appendix lA and lB for the 'Living Will', Australian and
American.
Weir, R.F. Ethieal Issues in Death and IJying, p.xvii.
A.B.C. Nationwide, November 28, 1983.
Bertram and Sandman, op.eit., note 3, p.84.
The law at the moment does not incorporate such aspects.
Brody, B. "Voluntary euthanasia and the law", in M. Kohl (Ed.),
Benefieen_t Euthanasia. New York, 1975, pp.218-219.
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those who feel that, if what is known of the person's wishes and preferences is to the effrrt of terminating life, then there exists a
•
.r •
t o do so. 39
pPZ,,ma
Jac~e case

3.6.1

*

Necessary Elements of Consent
In order for consent to be valid, the following elements are

necessary:
(1)

Consent must be informed.

(2)

Consent must be voluntarily given.

(3)

The person giving it must be 'competent to do so.

(4)

The consent must cover the act that it is given for. 40
I

3.6.1.1

Fully informed consent:
This is an essential safeguard and one of the best defences

against injustice.

As applied to euthanasia, the patient should have

the right to consent to his treatment or to his own death and to participate in those decisions that determine when death will occur and how
life will continue.
The doctor has the obligation to determine the patient's
wishes and to inform him of the prognosis, of various forms of treatment and how each may affect or alter the prognosis.

The risks,

discomforts and how much these can be alleviated, what functional life
\
can be restored, must also be explained. Whether a cure or a remission is anticipated should also be pointed out.

In countries where

the patient bears the cost of treatment and hospitalisation, this may
----·~---------E-U.- !----~.P-------~6-!~-·-··-B------·---·--·-·--~·-w-•-·~
- ~~--~~

(39}

Brandt, op.cit., note 17, pp.112-113.

(*) As it has already been pointed1 out, however, in our modern medi-

ca 1 care systems, th.e patient s wishes are very un 11 ke ly to be
known, since doctors in large institutions are not likely to know
the patient before admission.,
(40} O'Sullivan, J. Law for Nurses. (3rd Ed.), Sydney, 1983, p.41.
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be a significant factor in any decision taken , And the pati ent shoul d
be informed of such costs.
The process of relaying the above information for fully
informing a patient can be very complex.

With modern technology,

treatments have become highly technical and their details understood
by few specialists.

The question of who should give the informa tion,

the expert specialist or the patient 1 s doctor, becomes important.
much of it is to be told?
be answered truthfully?

How

ls hope to be removed? Must all questions
The patient 1 s perception of 11 te qua 1i ty

could help if known.
It has not been uncommon for doctors to withhold infonnation
and present an unduly optimistic picture, as well as attempting to
prolong life as long as possible, making use of all facilities, artificial and otherwise, even when delaying death prolongs the agonies of
the patient and his family.

Williams believes that, when the prognosis

is hopeless and there is much suffering, discussions to inform those
concerned and to ascertain their wishes are crucial.

If euthanasia is

considered, the opinions of any special conmittees should also be
sought. 41
The time of relaying the information is also crucial, but
choosing the approprtate moment can be very hard. legally
it should be
\
.
.

\

given when the person is alert and can appreciate the complexities so
that a sound and steady judgement may be made.

But is it humane to
~

speak of death when death is the last thing in the person's mind? But
then, when one is too ill, or too affected by treatment, to consider
what is involved, is the consent obtained valid?
(41} Williams, op.ait., note 6, p.148.

If the risk and/or

- 51 benefits cannot be assessed, is the person's wish to discontinue
treatment to be obeyed?
This point, carried to its extreme, can be taken to mean
that when someone is ill and distressed and wants death, he is in no
mental condition to have his request for euthanasia taken seriously.
Cases have been known where this has actually happened 42 for the above
reason, and because the resident doctor did not know the patient.
The other extreme is that, when one is well and ha ppy and
one's requests would be respected, one 1s unlikely to ask for de ath.
That some of those that have requested euthanasia often change their
mind when their suffering is relieved, even if they are fatally ill,
further complicates matters. 43
What is of concern to patients is that, if the decisions are
made, will they be respected or brushed aside as invalid?
doctors are inclined to consider euthanasia;
them from destroying life.

Not all

their calling prevents

Their tendency to label patients as irra-

ti ona 1 or too sick to be taken seriously. or worse s til 1, as incompetent,
and thus brush their requests aside, stems not only from thei.r selfperception as healers but also from their increased fear of litigation.
Thus many patients may suffer and be subjected to unwished-for heroic
trea trnen ts and measures, s i nee doctors, for one or aJ 1 of the above
\

.

reasons, refuse to withhold treatment or to issue ''no resuscita.tion
ord.e rs It·. 44 ,45

Cawley, M.A.

nEuthanasia: Should it be a choice? 11 , American
Journai of Nursing, Vol. 77, May 1977, pp.859-861.
( 43) Hinton, op.cit~, note 14, pp.14-17.
(44} Cawley, op.cit., note 42, p.860.
(45} Ko 1a ta, G.B. "Withho 1ding medi ca 1 treatment 11 , Science, Vo 1. 205,
August 31, 1979, pp.882-885 • .
(42)
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3.6.1.2

The consent must be voluntarily given:
In what sense can a person exercise free will under duress

of a failing body, possibly increasing insurmountable pain and potent
drugs, in a hospital environment, while dependent for care on the

46

hospital staff?

"Illness makes one dependent and eager to please".

Much has been written about the constraints of institutionalisation on free consent.

The patient who is ill, particularly if

seriously ill, is undoubtedly in some measure intimidated by the
hospital setting, aware of his dependency on its staff and technology
for curative or palliative care.

Separation from his family. in a

foreign environment, with rigid rules on visiting, possibly in a unit
a ,, great distance from home, all add to the sense of loneliness, separation and increased intimidation.
all is pain.

But the most important factor of

Pain is associated with general discomfort and malaise,

fatigue, sickness.

It is tiring and emotionally draining.

The

patient in prolonged pain might agree to virtually anything for relief.
All these factors constitute a potent force of subtle coercion, hence:

"to disau.ss a patient's wishes about extra-ordina.:ry aare
47 a decision that
under pain is to expect a decision under duress",

would be more the staff's than the patient's and which, given under
duress, is therefore invalid.
\

3.6.1.3

\

Competence:

The patient's competence at the time consent is sought is a
crucial factor in achieving informed, valid consent.

Often it is

(46) Tupin, S.P. "Some psychiatric issues of euthanasia", in M. Kohl
(Ed.), Beneficent Euthanasia. New York, 1975, p.196.
( 47}

Ibid., p.201.
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<lssumed that, if the person appears to be incompetent, confused or
1

not himself', then one need not bother with consent, or if the

patient expresses an opinion under such circumstances, it is l egiti1

mate to disregard that opinion.
Enforced treatments are justified on the grounds that the
patient is not competent to decide.

Aggressive efforts can go on and
'

on because of the doctor's fear of being caught in a legal trap. 48
There have been cases where psychiatric assessment became necessary
prior to the patient being declared competent to decide whether he
wished to continue or discontinue treatment. 49
The cases of the incompetent and of terminally ill patients,
Clfld children who cannot speak for themselves, present the toughest of
all ethical dilemmas.

Increasingly, the answers have been sought in

courts, in spite of the strong feelings held by many physicians that
courts are far less qualified than they to make life-and-death deci.
50
s1ons.

The case of Karen Quinlan was only the. first of a series
that has concerned and confused lawyers and doctors alike.
subsequent cases, the courts' decisions have varied.

In

In the Joseph

Saikewicz case, * the court ruled that· the courts should make such
decisions.

The court acknowledged that a11 person\ hav_e a right to
•

(48)

Huttman, B.R. "No code? Slow code? Show code? Dilenunas in
practiceu, American Jo'U.PnaZ of Nursing, Vol.82, January 1982,
p.132.

(49}

Clark, M., Gosnell, M. and Shapiro, D. "When doctors play God:
The ethics of life-and-death decisions", Newsweek, August 31,

(50)
( *)

McConnick, op.ait., note 33.

1981, p.41.

Joseph Saikewicz was 67 years old, had an IQ of 10, a mental age
of 2 years, 8 months, and was suffering from acute myeloblastic
monocytic leukaemia. The institution in which he lived sought
court approval to withhold chemotherapy (therapy with cytotoxic
drugs}. In July 1976, approval was given. Joseph died 2 months
later. In November 1977, the court published its reasons.
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refuse life-prolonging treatment.

It also acknowledged that there are

public or state interests in preserving life, protecting the innocent
\

and maintaining the integrity of the medi cal profession, and that in
some cases the weight given to these interests may not permit the
exercise of the private right to refuse treatment. 51 That indicates
that the public good is above that of individual interests , and that
individuals' lives may be prolonged for the purpose of social benefit.
In the case of children and minors, the questions are numerous - ethical, moral, economic and soc.ial.

Should babies doomed to

a blighted life be enabled to survive? Who should decide:
doctors, the courts, the parents?

the

If the parents have the right to

give informed consent, does this mean they also have the right to deny
consent, even when such denial means death for their child?
When parents decide to withhold consent, a number of questions
on the rights and obligations of doctors, nurses, other staff and
societ~

arise.

Should doctors go ahead regardless?

court interference?

Should they seek

Should nurses go against parental and medical

advice and feed malformed babies?

Does society have the right to take

the case to the courts and to impose the burden of care onto parents?
Some would say 'yes' and some would say 'no'.

The question

is, if one says 'yes', which infants should be allowed to die?
\
what grounds? By whose criteria?

On

In most cases so far taken to courts, in spite of medical
intervention against the parents' wish, the babies have died. 52 Some
(51)
(52)

Thompson, C.J.H. "Treatment of incompetent terminally ill
patients: The American experience 11 , The Medicai Journai of
Australia, Vol.I, February 20, 1982, p.188.
McCormick, R.A. "To save or let die: The dilemmas of modern
medicine", JAMA, Vol.229, July 8, 1974, p.172.
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have not and the parents say, of the burden of care imposed on them,
11

It is not fair 11• 53

In a study at Yale University School of Medicine,

Department of Pediatri cs, of the 299 deaths in the special-care nursery
over a period of three years, 14 percent were associated with discontinuance of treatment because of poor prognosis for "meaningful life"~ 4
An awesome and agonising choice for staff and parents, because of its
finality and the potential f9r error in prognosis, but one which made
many of the doctors involved admit that this was not a new event;

it

had been an implicit practice that is now becoming more explicit.

It

is happening in Australia too.

Paediatricians are seeking guidelines

because they are faced with more frequent decisions as to whether to
"save or let die 11 •

55

In spite of publicity, we are no closer to setting any
guidelines and the parents, the doctors, and those close to the
deformed child or incompetent patient will still be faced with making
increasingly controversial decisions in the context of growing
ambiguity.
There are, of course, those that do not believe in euthanasia as currently understood, but support the 'good death' idea.

This

group of people believes that the aim should be to provide care for
the imminently dying by providing:
(a)
(b)

(c)
(d)
(53)
(54)

(55)

relief of pain;
\
relief of suffering (physical and emotional);
respect for the patient's right to refuse treatment;
universal provision of total health care.

and

Clark et al., op.cit., note 49, p.44.
Duff, R. and Campbell, A.G.N., "Moral and ethical dilemmas in
the special care nurseryu, The New England Journal. of Mediaine,
Vol.289, October 25, 1973, pp.890-891.
Hawley, J. "Life in the balance", IZZawa'l'ra Me'l'cwy, July 7,
1983, p.10.
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That is, no family alone should have to carry the burden of extensive
care and costs.

In this form, mercy can be extended to patients

without inducing death.
Some supporters of this line are E. Kubler-Ross and
Dr. Saunders, the founder of hospice in the United Kingdom.
the above\ principles are being implemented by hospices.
speaking of euthanasia, says:

Most of

Hinton, on

"If euthana.sia were accepted, would there

be just as great an impetus to improve further the care of the dying? 1156

It is a worrying thought that deficiencies in providing care for the
incurable could find a latent counter-balance in increased requests for
euthanasia.

But there is also the concern that many people's request

for letting die could go unanswered in the hope and the quest for a
better way to die than that which is currently common in busy hospitals
and nursing homes.

(.56}

Hinton, op.cit., note 14, p.147.
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TERMINAL CARE IN SETTINGS OTHER
THAN THE ACUTE CARE HOSPITAL

4.1

INTRODUCTION
Once, a person died at home, surrounded by family, neighbours

and clergy.

With the gradual shift to the hospital and its sophisti-

cated technology, family care and support were taken out of the hands
of the family and so was death.
strangers who were professionals.

They were placed in the hands of
Conirol over personal fate shifted

from the patient to the institution and its staff.

In an environment

where the emphasis was more on cure than care, pathology became central
and people peripheral. The dying found themselves isolated from their
support systems and their familiar environment.

They were cared for

in an atmosphere of technical efficiency but also of depersonalisation.
In such an environment, impersonal attitudes towards death and dying
inevitably developed.
Medical and nursing staff became

incre~singly

engrossed in

the advancements of medical technologies, concentrating their efforts
into providing better technical care, particularly for those who would
get better.

As these professionals learned to rely more and more on

technological instruments and tools, they became more and more distant
\

.

from the patient as a person. The sick person was seen more as a condition to be investigated, a diseased organ to be treated and cured, than
as a sick person in need of care as well as cure. 1

It has been

erroneously assumed that technical care, because of its effectiveness
(1) Mauksch, H.D. "The organisational context of dying", in
E. Kubler-Ross, Death, the final stage of g~owth. New Jersey,
1975, p.23.

- 58 in many cases, will also be effective for tenninally ill patients;

the

basic assumption being that technical care is better and that it can
replace human care.

In such an environment the dying received effi-

cient technical care but their total care as dying individuals has been
grossly neglected. 2
Once the care of the dying was moved into hospitals, the
dying were left with little choice but to either enter and die in
hospital or stay at home.

Since quality care of the dying requires

very little or no technology, the
has always been limited.

finan~ing

of the home health services

The dying patients' families have thus been

faced with the dilerrma of either managing the round-the-clock care with
little or no help, employing trained nursing personnel for after hours
and weekends * if they could afford it, or institutionalising their sick
usually hospitalising them. 3 This marked absence of choice ts
greater in Australia than it is in England or in America.

In England,

home health and help services are quite widespread and well dev eloped,
and in America terminal care teams are enhancing the home nursing services.
The financing differs in each country.
The hospital, with its isolation and depersonalisation, its
technological intrusion, the unnecessary investigations and treatments
and the associated suffering, has remained and still is, the only choice
for most dying persons.

Those wishing to die in an' environment

different from that of the hospital, but still not being cared for by
their family, had, and mostly still have, not much choice as to where
they go.
(2)

(*)
(3)

Morris, W.A. "Care of the tenninally ill in a district general hospital", British Medical Journal, Vol.282, January 24, 1981, p.287.
Most home health services, particularly in Australia, are on a
Monday to Friday, 9 am to 5 pm basis, if they are offered at all.
Amado, A., Cronk, B.A. and Mileo, R. "Cost of terminal care: home
hospice vs hospital", Nursing Outlook, Vol.27, August, 1979, p.522.
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Gradually the subtle yet marked dissatisfaction with
prevailing treatments and ways of dying surfaced.

Open discussions of

how death touches all, of the treatment and care of the terminally ill,
and of how the dying and their families can be helped, became more
common.

The increasing dissatisfaction with so much technological

intervention and yet so little concern for the human beings with lifetenninating illnesses, has

l~d

to the search for alternatives.

The

recognition of the inadequacy of care of the dying in the acute care
setting, where death is at odds with the goals of care and control of
disease, has led to the hospice movement.

Hospices came into being in

an attempt to fill the hiatus between home and hospital as a place to
die.

Now, at least some of those not wishing extraordinary measures

to be used to prolong their lives, but not wishing to die at home, have
a choice.

As hospices proliferate, more people will be able to make

this choice between hospital, hospice or home as a place to die.

4.2

THE HOSPITAL CARE OF THE DYING

4.2.1

Some Cri.ti ci sms
The hospital care of the dying bas been criticised for its

isolation and its loneliness and its emphasis on technical care, while
neglecting the care of the total person as a human being. 4 The

\

standard of nursing care of the dying in hospitals is also poor.
Lamerton feels that" ... did this not arise from ignorance one wouid
caii it hospitai neglect". 5 Crititicism has also been levelled at
the medical staff for their failure to relieve distress from physical
(4)

(5}

Buckingham, R.W. "Primary care of the tenninally ill", Geriatrics,
Vol.34, December 1979, p.73.
Lamerton, R., as quoted in "The care of the dying: a specialty 11 ,
Editorial, Nursing Times, Vol.74, March 16, 1978, p.436.
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symptoms, fear and panic and for not calling in other professionals who
can be of help to the dying. 6 This is further aggravated by the fact
that many doctors fail to recognise that there is a problem. They feel
that the dying receive good care and that nothing further is required. 7
Yet evidence suggests that physical symptoms are inadequately treated.
In one study of patients in the last week of their life, 16 percent
were in almost continuous physical distress, while 27 percent suffered
substantial distress less continuously.

In another survey, 54 percent

had pain, 18 percent were always in some pain and 26 percent had severe
or very severe pain.
untreated. 8

Depression and anxiety were also often left

There are, of course, those who believe that hospital is the
best place for the dying.
within this group.

Many patients, relatives and doctors fall

Little evidence exists indicating where best to

treat and care for those who are mortally ill.

What evidence there is

shows no consistent difference in ratings overall, though there are
differences on specific aspects.

The findings of a 1979 survey,

compari _ng places and policies for terminal care, led Hinton to conclude
that it is not necessarily unkind to keep the dying in acute hospitals
that are more concerned with investigations and cures.

The hospital

scores came between the hospice and the foundation home * used in the
(6) Doyle, D. "Domiciliary terminal care", The Praati,tioner, Vol.224,
June 1980, p.577.
(7) Lichter, I. "Caring for the dying", The New Zea'land Medical, Journal,
Vol.93, January 14, 1981, p.15.
(8) Simpson, M.A. "Planning for terminal care", The Lancet, Vol .2,
July 24, 1976, pp.192-193.
(*) These are outdated public assistance institutions taken over as
hospitals under the National Health Service in 1948, and now used
as hospitals for the chronically ill, most of them terminally ill.
In spite of renovations, however, some foundation homes are so
inappropriate and deficient that they have been called 'human warehouses'. Such a poor reputation makes many dying determined to
stay at home, even if they have to suffer excessively.
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study, showinq that patients felt that there were neither overwhelming
advantages or disadvantages in being cared for in such a setting.

The

trend favouring the hospital over the home reached statistical significance in data from the spouses. 9 In Australia, particularly in
rural areas, hospital care is the only choice and some feel that because
The
of the corrmunity aspect, it can be a home away from home. 10
opposite can be argued, of course.

That is, since for many the familiar

hospital environment can be a reminder of past hopes and expectations of
cure, it can be very upsetting and distressing as the end approaches.

4.3

PAIN MANAGEMENT
It is the pain of dying of which most people are in fear.

Pain is the most notorious discomfort and often the thought of pain
concerns people more than the fact that they are going to die.

Being

free of pain greatly assists the patient in dealing with death realistically.

For many, death is a welcome relief from a prolonged and

painful dying.

Medical practice should not concern itself exclusively

with the prolongation of life by administering technically possible
treatments.
of suffering.

The practice should be equally concerned with the relief
Pleas for the legalisation of euthanasia are based on

too many cases of unrelieved pain and other forms of distress.

The

strength of the euthanasia appeal is to remedy cruelty and dehumanization.

"The continued evidenae of suffering will gradually make it

more plausible", Dame Cicely Saunders believes.

11

(9) Hinton, J. "Comparison of places and policies for terminal care",
The Lancet, Vol.I, January 6, 1979, pp.29-32.
(10) Gates, G.R. "Terminal care in country practice", AuatraZ.ian Family
Physician, Vol.11, May 1982, p.341.
(11) Saunders, Dame Cicely, "Principles of symptom control in terminal
care", Mediaal Clinics of North Ameriaa, Vol.66, September 1982,
p.1171.
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The easing of pain and suffering should be the primary concern of professional carers, even at the risk of addiction, if the
patient approves;
issue.

for if death is near, addiction should not be an

Narcotics should therefore be given freely and regularly when

needed.

Opiates, being drugs of addiction, make the original decision

to use them difficult, especially in chronic illness when death is a
long way off.

Doctors and

n~rses

may need to revise their opinion on

this when the patient is dying and medication should aim at relieving
pain, anxiety and the fear of pain that can occupy the dying person's
uppermost thoughts to the exclusion of ~11 else. 12
It was mainly the unsatisfactory relief of pain of the dying
in hospitals and the reluctance of doctors to prescribe regular analgesia that prompted Dr. Saunders * to start the first hospice in London.
She has effectively demonstrated that regularly administered narcotics
control pain and render untenable the arguments of addiction and overdosage as justification for not medicating patients in pain on a
round-the-clock basis. 13

Pain relief, using oral medication for as long as possible,
should be the aim, leaving more invasive methods as a last resort. 14
Even the comatosed patient should be assumed to experience pain, some
feel, and analgesia should therefore continue. 15 Evidence regarding
pain management is contradictory when comparing hospttal ·pain relief
with home care pain control.

Some studies show that pain was control-

led as successfully at home as in hospitalised patients, and that in
(12)

Buckingham, op.ait., note 4, pp.74-75.

(*) Now Dame Cicely Saunders.
( 13)
(14)
(15)

Geltman, R.L. and Paige, R.L., "Symptom management in hospice
care", American JoumaZ of Nu.rBing, Vol .83, p. 78.
Clarke, K.M. and Tempest, S.M., "Analgesics in tenninal malignant
disease 11 , BritiBh Medical Joumai, Vol.2, July 7, 1979, p.47.
Lamerton, R.C., "Cancer patients dying at home. The last 24
hours", The P!taatitioner, Vol.223, December 1979, p.813.
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fact, because of the decreased level of anxiety and stress which
contribute to pain, home patients were able to participate in family
routines until shortly preceding death. 16 , 17
In those studies in which unsatisfactory relief of pain was
found, this was most often due to the doctor's failure to prescribe
and titrate medication levels for optimal relief, or to the patient's
reluctance to accept medication out of fear that it would be detrimental to his recovery. 18 The fact that some surveys are retrospective
and rely on views expressed by surviving carers who tend to perceive
more suffering than the professionals, may also affect the results
presented.

This was found to be the case by Reilly and Patten, whose

study showed that the perception of the intensity of the patient's
physical suffering and psychological distress differed considerably
between relative carers and professionals. 19 , 20
More recently it has
been demonstrated that, in spite of good management, teaching and
experience, 25 percent of home-managed patients suffered continuous
pain, as compared to 20 percent in hospital, and below 10 percent in
21 The latter appears to be the most successful in pain
.
hosp1ce.
relief and management.

This could be due to the fact that only dying

patients in their last three months of life are accepted in hospices.
( 16)

(17)

(18)

Lauer, M.F. and Camitta, B.M., "Home care for dying children: A
nursing model", The Journal of Pediatrics, Vol,.97, pp.1034-1035.
Sampson, W.L, 11 Dyi.ng at home", JAMA, Vol.238,\ November 28, 1977,
p.2405.
Murray Parkes, C., "Home or hospital? Terminal care as seen by
surviving spouses", Journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners, Vol.28, January 1978, pp.22-26.

{19)

Ibid.

(20}

Reilly, R.M. and Patten, M.P., 11 Tenninal care in the home",
Journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners, Vol .31,
September 1981, pp.532-534.
Doyle, D., op.cit., note 6, pp.577.

(21}
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4.4

DYING AT HOME
When patients and their families wish it, home can be the

best place to die, but it can also be the worst place if family
willingness is lacking.

Of course, home care is not for everyone and

not all patients are suitable for it.

Even when physical facilities

are adequate, the emotional adjustments needed must not be minimised.
Caring for the sick and dying has been so completely removed from
everyday experiences that the stress of caring may cause tensions so
that the sick are barely tolerated.

F9r many people, dependence on

family or friends can be difficult to endure.
4.4.1

Criteria for Successful Home Care
The first and most essential requirement for successful home

care is willing relatives and friends who are prepared to undertake the
responsibility.

It must be remellbered that they may be reluctant to

do so because they feel inadequate and lacking in nursing skills.

It

is most important that adequate relief is organised for the relatives,
especially if much attention is required outside .waking hours.

The

inevitable desire to attend to all the patient's wants can soon turn
into deep regret and even resentment when the lack of much-needed rest
and sleep wears one down. 22

To achieve this, the carers must know

what available help there is, if any, and how to get it.
\

Help may not always be available but even when it is, limited
use is often made of it, either because carers and patients are largely
unaware of such help except for nursing, as found by Reilly and PatteJ,3
or because families wish to avoid intruders or are even reluctant to
(22)
(23)

Gates, op.cit., note 10, p.342.
Reilly and Patten, op.cit., note 20, p.534.
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admit they need help.

Doyle, in a 1982 survey, found that only 52

percent of seriously ill patients had a District Nurse and the
seriousness of their condition or of their symptoms did not seem to
make any difference. *
are well developed.

In England, home help and home nursing services
Night sitt,ers are available to patients at least

three times a week; yet only 10 to 15 percent of patients made use of
them.

Over 41 percent of the patients in this study died at home and

it was felt that nearer to 50 percent would do so if more night help
was available. 24
4.4.2

Advantages of Dying at Home

4.4.2.1

For the patient:
The potential benefits of home care for the terminally ill

have long been established.

Studies have determined that most dying

patients prefer spending their final days at home rather than in
hospitai. 25

The dying person can feel accepted, with no fear of iso-

lation and loneliness or inappropriate handling.

The patient is in

control of the situation and not in an intimidating system.

The

professionals are no longer threatening or part of a power system over
which the dying have no control.

Home care nullifies the risks of

unnecessary treatments and interference, of intubation-resuscitation
and heroic measures, thus allowing a peaceful end with
no prolongation
\
of existence and suffering. .

(*) This, Doyle felt, was due to the possible reluctance of patients

or families to report symptoms or, if they did, whether these
were brought to the attention of the nurse. The latter points
to unsatisfactory monitoring of the patient's needs and places
the doctor's central position in this case in question.
(24) Doyle, D., "Domiciliary tenninal care: Demands on statutory
services", JoUl"YUlZ of th,e Royal CoZZege of GeneroZ Pl'aatitioners,
Vol.32, May 1982, p.291.
(25) Sampson, op.ait., note 17., p.2405.
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Many patients and their families view discharge from hospital
to the home as a mixed blessing.

Yet the home environment, with its

familiar faces and things, can ease the trauma of adjustment that
terminal illness imposes.

At home the person retains his dignity and a

degree of independence and control over his life, his affairs and his
destiny, even when bodily functions begin to fail.

He is not subjected

to hospital routines and discipline, often designed to fulfil the wishes
of the professionals rather than those of the patient. 26 Home allows
more choices which are more likely to be honoured. It provides contin. f orces th e person s l"d en t l t y. 27 Hab"t
u1·ty an d re1n
l s can be observe d as
0

0

I

long as possible.
sense of security.

Familiar surroundings help maintain stability and a
Disorientation is less likely.

Murray Parkes found

that people dying at home were much more likely to remain mobile, out of
bed and in clear consciousness than patients dying in hospital. 28
4.4.2.2

For the family:
Family involvement in most cases is good for the family.

It

gives them the opportunity to do something concrete that helps them
face dying and eases acceptance.

Home care mitigates feelings of guilt

and assists in the process and resolution of grief.

Above all, family

and patient are not robbed of the privilege of making the most of the
valuable time left. 29 Relationships previously fragmented can be
\

-

cemented and the opportunity to nurse a relativ;e expiates guilt and
results in warm memories.

Having done all one feels one could have

done leaves a positive feeling.
(26)
(27)
(28}

(29)

Turnbull, P.R.G., "Home, hospital or hospice care for the terminally ill?", Patient Management, Vol.4, August 1980, p.61.
Putnam, S.T., McDonald, M.M., Miller, M.M., Dugan, S. and
Logue, G.L., "Home as a place to die", American Journal of
Nursing, Vol.80, August 1980, p.1452.
Murray Parkes, op.cit., note 18, p.22.
Buckingham, op.cit., note 4, p.75.
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Studies have shown that grief and guilt are resolved more quickly and
effectively when the family participates in the care.

In a programme

for dying children, many parents reported that their feelings of guilt
and grief were eased by the knowledge that they had successfully
completed a difficult and demanding task. 30 The same group displayed
better adjustment patterns and relatively rapid attainment of the
family's previous lifestyle. 31 Cormnunication between the home carers
and the patient has been found to be much more open than between institutional carers and the patient; more home carers than doctors spoke
openly with the patients about their impending death. 32 Also, spouses
of hospital-centred patients suffer more psycho-physical distress, as
determined by anorexia, weight loss, insomnia, tiredness and forgetfulness, than spouses of home-centred patients. 33
4.4.3

Disadvantages of Dying at Home
When someone dying is managed at home, his presence dominates

family life and disrupts nonnal routines.

For working adults, this

means additional pressure and workload, or even loss of a job and of
economic independence.

Fears and anxieties about the patient's well-

being, the family's ability to provide adequate care, and the anticipation of emotional stress can all deter people from attempting this
transition.

\

.

If demand is constant and pressure is great and not

relieved, relations grow weary and then the patient may perceive his
care as a burden. Gui 1t fee 1ings can then arise for a 11. 34
{30}
{31)

Lauer and Camitta, op.ait., note 16, p.1034.
Lauer, M.E., Mulhern, K.R., Wallskog, J.H. and Camitta, B.M.,
"A comparison study of parental adaptation following a child's
death at home or in the hospital 11 , Pediatrias, Vol. 71, January
1983, pp.107,110 &111.
(32) Reilly and Patten, op.ait., note 20, p.536.
{33) Murray Parkes, op.ait., note 18, p.15.
{34} Lichter, op.ait., note 7, p.15.
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The lack of home care facilities and of round-the-clock
medical coverage can make the home carer•s task very heavy and apprehension greater.

The social isolation of the dying and their families by

relatives, friends and neighbours reduces the chances of outside help
even further.

Our death-denying culture is so strong and attitudes so

deeply embedded that people feel uncomfortable in the presence of a
dying person.

They begin to avoid them at a time when their help and

support is most needed, particularly so where home care support is
lacking, which is often the case in Australia. 35
Unfamiliarity with methods of caring for the sick, practices
that the professionals, particularly nurses, take for granted, can be of
great concern to the family.

Caring has been so removed from daily life

that even simple tasks need to be taught.

The perceived professional

efficiency adds to the family's sense of insecurity and inadequacy.

A

source of great stress to the family and the patient is the progression
of terminal disease.

As the end approaches, misapprehension of how to

handle it increases tension and anxiety.

As the family grows weary,

these are magnified, so that even the effects of drugs administered
are a cause for concern, even of mistrust of the doctor near the deathbed.

Lamerton attributes this situation to the damaging propaganda of
the euthanasia lobby. 36

Home care is quite often not all that it cquld be. The hardship and squa 1or met at times has shocked some peop 1e37 yet Reilly and
Patten found that home unsuitability was rarely mentioned as a
(35)

Williams, G.,

(36)
(37}

"How to cope with dying", Series of 3 articles,

Morwning Herald, July 19, 20, 21, 1983, p.9.
Lamerton, op.cit., note 15, p.815.
Hinton, J., Dying. Harmondsworth, 1972, p.152.

Sydney
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problem.

38

However, dying at home can be just as lonel y as dying in

an institution and the chance of enduring more pain is often
greater. 39
4.4.4

Support for the Family
Relatives determined to care for their dying at home will and

do find a way.

Such families are few.

Fewer still are those who are

well p. ·epared to deal with the various problems that home care entails.
If home care is to succeed, the professional health care team
support is crucial for both actual care and moral support.

This must

be available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and needs to
be supported by a network of resources that will permit needs to be met
as they become evident.

A list of numbers to call, on a twenty-four

hour telephone basis is a much-needed comfort and gives the carers a
sense of security.

That someone can respond to their ca 11 for he 1p
allays fears and possible panic. 40 Assurance that emergency measures
can be obtained if needed to manage a crisis at home has been reported
by families as the most important service. 41
Forewarning the family of what to expect next helps them cope.
Doctor's visits, even if nothing can be done, are supportive.

Advice

on what to do and what not to do as death approaches is crucial.
family needs support and help so that they do not

pa~ic

The

and, in an

attempt to fight back against death, transfer the patient to hospital
where unnecessary procedures, even resuscitation, may be carried out.
Many families experience a sense of urgency as death approaches.
(38)
(39}
(40)
(41)

Reilly and Patten, op.eit., note 20, p.536.
Murray Parkes, op.eit., note 18, p.26.
Morris, op.eit., note 2, p.288.
Putnam et ai., op.eit., note 27, p.1452.

The
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need to do something can undercut their original determination to let
their patient die in peace. 42
Above all, the hospitalisation option must remain open.

The

burden of care may sometimes become too great to manage at home, even
when considerable help is made available through the various domiciliary
43
Care must be exercised for hospitalisation not to be seen
services.
as a failure if it becomes necessary.

Timely hospitalisation is impor-

tant, before the family is exhausted and before it is too late for the
patient to benefit from the move. 44
At times the relatives may need a short break from the stress
of caring for their dying.

A temporary admission to an in-patient

facility may be all that is needed to provide relief.

More often,

temporary admissions are necessary to achieve symptom control and
re-adjustment of treatment and care.

This is because of the changing

pattern of symptoms as the disease advances or the end approaches.

Of

course, some people feel more secure as in-patients and others seek
admission so as not to burden the family.

The limited home care support

services could weigh heavily towards the patient's decision for institu.
1 care. 45
Doyle found that this accounted for 90 percent of
tlona
cases. 46 Sadly, some patients who would rather die at home and who

could be managed there, are unable to do so, because the families insist
that hospitalisation is better for them since there they .have all the
necessary services right at hand.

This is not infrequently encouraged

by the doctors, who either give in to family pressure, or feel insecure
(42) Lamerton, op.eit., note 15, p.816.
(_43) Lichter, op.eit., note 7, p.15.
(44) Murray Parkes, op.eit., note 18, p.27.
(45) Lichter, op.eit., note 7, p.15.
(46) Doyle, op.ait., note 6, p.582.
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in their ability to manage the dying at home.

It seems that it is not

only the relatives who need to be re-educated and encouraged to manage
their dying at home, but doctors also need to regain their confidence~ 7
With the move towards home care, there is also more consideration given to the family, both during the terminal care period and
afterwards.

Practical help, professional help and the availability of

contact persons during the period of care and afterwards, are all part
of family care.

The latter is achieved by putting the family in touch

with support groups such as 'Make Today Count' * during the period of
care, and afterwards in touch with groups dealing with loss and
bereavement, such as 'The Society of Compassionate Friends' ** , an
organisation of bereaved parents, or 'Widow to Widow' *** , all of which
can offer great help and emotional support.t

4.5

THE HOSPICE MOVEMENT
The recognition that the physical and social environment

were as important a therapeutic tool for the dying as expert medical
management, led Or. Cicely Saunders to seek alternatives and to eventually establish the first hospice, that of St. Christopher's in London,
in 1967. Her work has provided a powerful impetus to the hospice movement.

Since then there has been increasing concern with the physical

and emotional needs of the dying patients and their \families.

(47)

(t)

Sampson, op.cit. note 17, p.2405.
Details of how these groups work can be found in:
Nursing Outlook, Vol.28, March 1980, p.174.
*
The
Lamp, Vol.37, May 1980, pp.41-43.
**
Nursing
Times, Vol.78, September 18, 1980, pp.97-98.
***
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Hospice Goals
The strength of the hospice lies in the ability of its staff

to concentrate on the problems of the dying and their families.
aims to make the final period before dea th

u::.

Hospice

cui1ilurtable and productive

as possible for the dying and hi s family, and at home if at all possible.
Goals of care can be clearly de fined in a hospice and a therapeu tic
pattern established.

In hospice there is no high medical technology,

but intensive personal caring.
Symptom management and control are seen as necessary for the
patient's comfort and peace of mind.

In hospice there is a variety of

solutions to be used by staff, patient and family when trying to resolve
the problem.

The approach takes into account the needs of the patient

and the concerns of the family.
management are:

The most common problems requiring

pain, anorexia, nausea, vomiting, bowel problems such

as diarrhoea and constipation, skin problems, confusion, restlessness,
anxiety, depression, general weakness, incontinence.

Geltman and Paige

offer a detailed account of how these symptoms are managed under
hospice care. 48
The relief of pain, both physical and psychological, is a
hospice goal, seen as a prerequisite to attempts to alleviate emotional
and spiritual suffering.

Some of the approaches developed as part of
\

hospice care have revo 1utioni sed care for a11 pa ti en ts.

.

Such an

example is that of controlling pain without excessive drowsiness or
addiction.

Its feasibility was not appreciated until Dr. Saunders and

her staff had effectively demonstrated that regularly given narcotics
could be adjusted to the patient 1 s level of pain without fear of overdosage or addiction, the arguments often used for not medicating

(48}

Geltman and Paige, op.cit., note 13, pp.79-85.
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patients on a round-the-clock schedule and which have been rendered
untenable since. 49
Comfort, symptom management and frankness are hospice ha 11marks.

Hospice staff are prepared to talk frankly with the dying if

they wish it.

Lack of infonnation can increase fear and anxiety.

like any other form of suffering, needs to be relieved.
cation can do this better than drugs.

Fear,

Good communi-

Communication must be both

efficient and kind, with the main objective of maintaining morale and
helping the patient achieve equanimity and peace of mind.

There are,

of course, the few who do not wish to know, 50 but for the majority,
knowing makes their remaining life less troubled by the lack of knowledge, and Wilkes, in a survey, found that two-thirds of those who knew
their diagnosis were classed as having excellent quality of life at the
end. 51
Hospice uses a psychosocial model of care that provides good
physical care and comfort but also, because of its holistic approach,
views the patient's spiritual and psychosocial needs as being equally
important.

Mciver believes that this is the type of care needed, not

only by the dying, but also by those who are chronically ill. 52

For

the patient in distress, feeling rejected and neglected once all curative efforts have been exhausted, or who chooses no more curative

'

-

efforts, the wann competence of hospice staff and th~ir aim to improve
the quality of the remaining life can be the only ray of hope at a time
of despair. 53
(49)
(50)
(51)

(52)
(53}

Ibid.

Campbell, A.V. Moroi IJilemmas in Medicine. Edinburgh, 1975, p.159.
Wilkes, E. "Quality of life. Effects of the knowledge of diagnosis
in terminal illness", Nursing Times, Vol.73, September 29, 1977,
p.1506.
Mclver, V. 11 A time to be born, a time to die 11 , The Canadian NUl'se,
Vol.76, September 1980, p.39.
Erle, H.R. "Tenninal care. The national scene and the individual
patient MediaaZ Clinias of North America, Vol.66, September 1982,
p.1161.
11

,
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4.5.2

Types of Hospices
In America there

ar~

presently about eight hundred
54 d . B . t .
hos p1. ces
an in n a1 n, aroun d f arty were open by 1981. 55

Th ree

hospice categories can now be distinguished:
(1)

Free-standing hospices - the original and most corrmonly
known type;

(2)

Hospital-based

(3)

Community-based specialist teams on terminal care, which
are reversing the traditional practice of taking the
patient to the care facility, by taking health care
personnel to the patient.

4.5.2.1

uni~s

- a more recent development;

and

Free-standing hospices:
Free-standing hospices attempt to fill the gap between home

care and acute hospital care.

Their goals and practices set them apart

from other forms of institutional care and make them the choice for a
patient wishing not to die at home, but also not wishing the type of
life prolongation and curative efforts that acute hospitals offer.
With increasing costs and the

contin~ed

expectation of the public for

care by professionals, the need for hospice care ·in institutions or at
home has begun to be carefully looked at.

Health policy-makers are

beginning to look at ways of how to encourage the integration of hospice
care into the existing health care system. 56
The risk here is loss of,
and inhibition of, innovation and diversity that have\ characterised
'

hospice practices so far.
4.5.2.2

Hospital-bas.ed units:
The hospital-based terminal care units, or palliative care

units, offer the significant advantage of economy of scale, but their
(54)
(55)
(56)

Geltman and Paige, op.ait., note 13, p.78.
Morris, op.ait., note 2, p.287.
"Experts probe issues around hospice care", In Hospitals, Vol .54,
June 1, 1980, pp.63-67.
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staff need to gain the ne cessary autonomy so as to handle competing
claims placed upon them by the large institution.

Their presence in

these ins ti tu ti ons can do much to influence and modify attitudes and
practices relating to death and dying.

These units are also consid-

ered desirable because they offer symptom control for the patient and
support for the family, while allowing access to specialists' services
should they be necessary. 57 .
4.5.2.3

Conmunity-based specialist teams:
Hospice principles can be applied anywhere, but not without

the expertise of a supporting team, and medical back-up.

The terminal

care corrmunity-based team is a new concept and has the advantage tha t
it can work within the existing system of care.

It can start immedi-

ately, using existing facilities and resources.

It brings hospice

skills and care to the patient at an earlier stage, without competing
with hospice institutions and it is relatively inexpensive.

It has

teaching potential and it appeals to General Practitioners who wish to
continue caring for their dying patients.

These .were some of the

advantages reported by the St. Thomas' Hospital Terminal Care Support
Team. 58
The goals of such a team are:

(a) rapid, informed clinical

evaluation of the terminally ill, with emphasis on effective symptom
\

control;

(b) attention for the patient but also for the family;

(c) planning future care, whether at home or in another care facility;
(d) reducing inappropriate procedures and providing up-to-date information on available resources;
(57}
(58)

Ce} providing continuity of care; and

Erle, op.cit., note 53, p.1162.
Bates, T., Clarke, D.G., Hoy, A.M. and Laird, P.P. 11 The St.
Thomas' Hospital Terminal Care Support Team: A new concept of
hospice care", The Lancet, Vol.I, May 30, 1983, pp.1201-1203.
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(f) researching into problems and dealing with them as they ar ise. 59
The terminal cilre t eams support the relatives and enable patients to
die at home if they so wish .

They consist of nurses, social workers,

physiotherapists, ch aplains, and a doctor specialising in terminal
care.
4.5.3

The Hospice as a Challenge
The hospice movement has caused con cern for some doctors who

saw it as the development of yet another specialty that would further
erode the family physician 1 s practice.

The movement has been viewed

by many as a movement for reform that has challenged customary attitudes and ways of care of the dying and has achieved the bringing about
of changes in these attitudes.

The rights and roles of patients, the

responsibility and accountability of care givers, have been discussed
and reformulated by individuals, institutions and professional
societies.

The physician s right to withhold an unfavourable or poor
1

prognosis from the patient, or to prescribe treatment without discussing
alternatives with the pa t ient has been challenged by the powerful
American Hospital Association in its Patients• Bill of Rights. 60

In

Australia, the Medical Consumers• As soci ation has responded by adopting,
modifying and publicising this Bill of Rights . *
The hospice movement has spread and i s now at a critical
point.

In America, where efforts are being made to eventually integrate

it into the health care system. the way in which it is integrated will
determine its scope, quality and longevity.
(59)
(60)

- - - ·- - - - - - - - - - - --- ·- --- -- ----Erle, op . eit ., note 53, p.1164 .
Wald, F.S., Foster, L. and Wald, H. J . , The hospice movement as a
health care refonn Nur•sing Out look , Vol .28 , March 1980,
pp.174-175.
See Appendix 3.
11

11

,

(*)

Though an institution

- 77 aiming at change needs f reedom to carry out its ideas, it mus t also
engage in negotiations to secure th e approval of regulatory agencies
trying to strike a balance between the ideal s of reform and t he
political and economic realities.

Reforme rs and th eir goa 1s rep re-

sent change and thus challenge the status quo.

Hospices' emphas is

on palliative care for symptom control is a challenge to cu rative
Intensive personal care is a challenge to intens ive tech-

treatment.

Family involvement chall enge s the pe rce ption of the family

nology.

as visitors only.

Interdisciplinary t eams are a challenge t o

specialisation and departmentalisation .

A system t hat prov ides

continuous care in a variety of setti ngs is a challenge to many health
agencies operating separately .

The qu estion that the movement must

now ask itself is:

If compromise i s ne ce ssa ry f or the survival of th e
movement, will the ideal survive with the compromise? 61 Mciver feels
very strongly about this, when she s t ates :
Hos pices should f unction independently from other
institutions t o prevent the car~j over of traditional attitudes, policies and pract i ce s. 62

4.6

COST OF TERMINAL CARE
Resources are, by definition, limite d.

There is an

increasing awareness that this economi c trui sm applies to t erminal
care resources too .

The cost differential of caring "for · the dying at

home, in a hospice or hospital has impli cations for total medical care
cost.

It also has health care poli cy impli cations, present and future.

It affects government cost containment initi atives and intensive care
provision plans for the dying .
· - - - - -- -- --- - - - - - - - -

(61)
(62)

Ib i d.

Mciver, op . cit., note 52 , p. 41 .

- 78 The cost of dying in institutional settings is commensurate
with the institution's level of function and technological equipment.
Heroic measures and medical interventions to postpone death require
costly high technology and medical expertise.

These are being increas-

ingly perceived by patients and their relatives as undesirable
intrusions, causing unnecessary suffering.

This suffering and the

rising costs prompt many people to remove themselves from the acute
hospital environment to that of a hospice, the home or, in Australia,
into a nursing home, * where the cost to the patient is less, intervention is avoided and death can occur in a more dignified and peaceful
manner.
As home care becomes established, terminal care shifts from
hospital-based medical management to home-based nursing management and
support.

Dying at home reduces the financial burden of being an in-

patient.

In-patient expenses can amount to 25 percent of the family's

weekly income.

In America, insurance companies are just beginning to

provide coverage for dying at home or in a hospice.

Most individual

policies also provide for some home care benefits, but money is hard
to get and it often entails undesirable obligations. 63
Hospice care has shown that, by reducing the appropriate
tests and procedures, it can deliver care at a cost below that of acute
hospital care, even when more time is given to the patient.

Yet third-

party reimbursement for hospice services has been a major issue in
America.

After the initial enthusiasm, the potential for excessive

cost and commercial abuse enjoined caution.

In a period of rapidly

(*) This will be elaborated upon later in this Chapter.

(63)

Lauer and Camitta, op.cit., note 30, p.1034.
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rising health care costs, the general unavailability of reimbursement
has slowed developments in this area. 64
Home, hospice or institutional hospi ce care supports the
family and the dying in meeting their objective, while keeping a numbe r
of hospital beds free.

This has a double effect when utilisation of

these beds by acute cases is taken into account.

Amado et al. found,

in a study of fifty-five patients, that home/hospice intervention saved
$93,549 at 1979 health care value, or 943 hospital bed days .

Hence

they recommend that, if third-party financing could be made available,
hospice care be fused onto existing health care services. 65 That home
or hospice care is a less expensive form of care for the dying, and
that excessive technology does not necessarily improve a person's
quality of life at this stage but only adds to cost, were the major
In this
findings of a pilot study conducted by Bloom and Kissick. 66
study, they measured the billed charges of the last two weeks of life
for terminally ill patients dying at home versus t hose dying in hospital.

It was found that the hospital terminal care was 10 . 5 times

greater, exceeding home care costs by $106,000 for nineteen patients.
This was found to be due to the grea t er range and larger quantity of
diagnostic and therapeutic services provided for the hospitalised
dying.

The 10.5 fold difference bought for them more intensive techno-

logical measures - diagnostic, therapeutic and palliative - with
diagnostic and therapeutic services given to nearly all patients until
the day of death. *
(64)
(65)
(66)

Erle, op. cit., note 53, p.1163.
Amado e t al ., op . ci f ., note 3, p. 526.
.
Bloom, B.S. and Kis s ick, P.O., "Home and hospital cost of care
in terminal illness
in K. Kingsbury, I Want to Die at Home,
1980, pp.59-64.
For cost details, see Appendix 4.
11

,

(*}
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The great cost differences found in the Bloom and Kissick
study suggest that home care is an important economic alternative to
67
hospital care in terminal illness.
The extraordinary disparity found
in this study raises the question of utilisation of scarce resources
and the necessity of such an extensive provision of these services to
terminally ill patients.

However, though the cost-effectiveness of

home care is obvious, the fact that issues of monetary costs bear a
complex relationship to other hidden costs to the family and society,
must not be disregarded.
consideration.

The quality of care must remain a primary

The fact that dying people may choose to avail them-

selves of the more costly but more intensive technological measures
of hospital care must also be taken into account.

That our society

has traditionally tended to provide the tenninally ill with sophisticated technological treatment, and to sustain life as long as possible
as a way of dealing with death and dying, must not be forgotten.

This

tendency has encouraged certain cultural attitudes and social expectations that can not be easily altered because of economic considerations.
Economic considerations could, in fact, further encourage the
All but one hospitalized patient in the
seeking of hospitalisation.
Bloom and Kissick study 68 would have qualified for benefits under the
proposed Catastrophic Health Insurance Legislation, as their bills
exceeded the $2,500 limit (mean cost was $2,986).

Cost coverage could

act as a strong incentive and stimulus to categorise dying and/or
tenninal illness as catastrophic and therefore a technological problem.
As such it could and should be managed in hospitals and be reimbursed
by health insurance funds.
- - -·- -- (67)

(68)

Ibid.
Ibid.
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While, in the American system, services are on a fee-forservice basis, in the British system the cost of terminal care is
borne by the Government who provides most he alth care services.

Thus

the incentive for seeking more viable economic alternatives t n hospital care remains with the Government .

The problems faced under the

British system are those of cost for the Government and those of
quality and standards of care for the patients . Many dying choose home
as a better alternative to that of institutional care, even if it
. 69 ' 70
entails more hardship and often more suffering.

4.7

THE AUSTRALIAN SCENE
The Australian system of care is somewhere in between the

British and the American system, except that neither system has an
exact equivalent to the Australian nursing home.

Survey findings

suggest that the cost of providing home care services is less than
the cost of hospital care, except in cases of extremely intensive
levels of home care.

In the same survey, the quality of home care was

found to be at least as good as hospital care when and if it could be
provided.

Ten to 33 percent of hospital, and 25 percent of nursing

home patients could be managed at home if adequate community-based
care facilities were available.

These findings were also borne out by
studies both in Britain and in Canada. 71
In the former, it was found
that only a small improvement in domiciliary care would keep 25 percent
of hospitalised dying out of hospital. 72
(69)
(70)
(71)
(72)

Hinton, op .cit., note 37, p. 152.
Murray Parkes, op.cit., note 18, p.26.
Relative Cost of Home Care and Nursing Home and Hospital Care in
Australia. Commonwealth Department of Health, Monograph Series

No.10, Canberra, 1980, pp.27, 85, 90, 93.
Hinton, op.cit., note 37, p.156.
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In Australia, home care services are greatly lacking and, if
present, they are still at a very rudimentary level.

As a result most

people die in hospitals or nursing homes, often in circumstances that
are far from ideal or desired by the dying. 73
4.7.1

Nursing Homes
In Australia, 'good care' is still seen as institut

care.

Nursing homes have developed into the institutions thJL 1u1til

the roles of:
(a)

providing respite care;

(b)

providing care for the chronically ill and those
incapable of self-care;

(c)

homes for the aged, providing long-term residential
care; and

(d)

often providing terminal care for those patients
unable to be managed at home and for whom the acute
hospital can offer no further treatment or care.
Admission is on medical or hospital social worker's recom-

mendation.

Nursing homes are required to be licensed.

.However,

some fail to maintain Health Department standards and thus lose their
licence.

Conditions and services also vary in the licensed homes.

Further, standards of care and staff training and expertise vary widely
from home to home.

It is important to note that 58 percent of all the

nursing workforce in nursing homes is comprised of Assistants in
\

Nursing* and 79.4 percent of these are in private nursing homes. 74
Australia has a higher number of nursing home beds per capita
than any other country.

This number was 4 beds per 1,000 population in

1976 and rose to 4.5 beds per 1,000 population in 1980.
(73)
(*)
(74)

In bed numbers

Williams, op.cit., note 35, July 20, 1983, p.9.
Untrained staff.
The Role and Function of the Enrolled Nursing Aide in New South
Wales, Report of the Task Force established by the Minister of

Education, Sydney, June 1981, pp.153-157.
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this means 55,578 nurs ing home beds in 1976 rose to 65 ,289 beds in 1980.
Of these, 35,850 are beds run for private profi t.

The State of New

South Wales has 26,529 beds, or 5. 2 beds per 1,000 populati on, of whi ch
17,539 are private profit beds. 75
Thi s may be partially due to the soci al demand for this type
of ins titutional care .
The r e has de veloped with-i n the community , accor ding to
the Department of Health, t he atti t ude that to have
your aged r e lative admitted to a Nursing Home is the
normal thing to do when t hat per son ceases to be able
to Zook a ft er hi mse lf ... by pl acement t here wi l l be
the f eeli ng that the famil y ' s obli gation has been
di schar ged. 76

This attitude has been perpetuated and encouraged and has become part
of the cultural attitudes and expectations of Austral i an society.

So

nursing homes have waiting lists and there is a public outcry for
improvements in the shortage of these beds.

Ironically, however,

thousands are living in them needlessly.
The present funding arrangements have also contributed to
this trend.

Approved nursing homes have Commonwealth subsidi es.

health funds also subsidise nursing home care .

Some

So it is easier for one

to receive cost coverage for institutional care than for home care.
General hospitals which are well equipped in terms of staff,
expertise and facilities to meet the dying patient's needs are being
\

criticised for their poor record of caring for the terminally ill.

At

the same time, 30 to 40 percent of the dying end their days in nursing
homes, in an environment of inadequacy of care and in a place totally
ill-equipped to manage the needs of the dying .
(75)
(76)

Hospita l s and Hea l t h Services Yea rbook 1981-82 . 7th Ed.,

Melbourne, 1981, pp.224-225.
In a home or at a home :

Accorrunoda.t ion and home care f or the aged.

A report from the House of Representatives, October 1982, as
quoted by Dorgan, D. and Myers, K., Who cares ? About caring f or
the ill at home . Surry Hill, N.S.W., 1983, p.73.
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As Professor Balfour Mount put it:
More is needed than tender loving care and this is
frequently coffplex enough that it has to be done by
a tearn. 77

The nursing home is hardly likely to provide this.
4.7.2

Hos pi ta l Care
Hospital costs have been escalating, with teaching hospital

bed day costs being the highest.

Yet surveys conducted at different

hospitals at various times show that an average of 10 percent of all
occupied beds are occupied by terminally ill patients, whose lifeexpectancy is less than three months and for whom the acute care
setting can offer no better care than other, less expensive, facilities, or even the home. 78 Most of these patients (40 percent) once
they are deemed terminal with no more curative treatment possible, are
often discharged into the hands of frantic, helpless, unprepared
relatives, who do not know how to cope and have no back-up services
for support, and nobody to turn to.

It comes as no surprise that the

dying are rushed back to hospital as death approaches.

At a time when

the dying need peace and comfort, they are faced with the trauma of
transfer and of possible technological intervention and needless
suffering.
In spite of escalating costs and repeated

~overnment

calls

for cost containment, the financial incentive is towards maintaining
institutional care rather than expanding domiciliary services.

The

fundamental problem is believed to be the Commonwealth funding policy,
particularly for nursing homes, which gives State and Local Governments
(77)

"The palliative care debate 11 , Cancer Review, Vol.3, September
1983, pp.2-3.

(78)

Ibid.
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the financial incentive to maintain nursing homes, rather than to
expand domiciliary care.

The 1982/83 Commonwealth spending on insti-

tutional care, used by 3 percent of the aged, was eleven times as much
as that of home care used by 10 percent of the aged. 79

This uniquely

Australian institution of care seems to have gained enough support to
attract high funding.
Health insurance benefits only apply to the institutional
care.

Payments are made for repeated hospitalisation or for care in

other long-term institutional facilities, but not for home care or
home services.

Thus many patients can not afford to go home, even

when the relatives are willing to take them, and professional care can
be arranged.

This is because home nursing is very expensive and

hospital and medical funds refund far more towards the cost of institutional care than towards home care.

Benefits for home care are

limited to only two, both of which are means tested, one of them
twice - the only benefit in Australia to be doubly means tested. 80
Home nursing services are mainly available to residents of
major cities on a Monday to Friday, 9 am to 5 pm basis.
and weekend care remains totally unsupported.

After hours

If private nurses are

engaged, the family usually bears the costs.
Home care, if it is to become a viable alternative to insti\

tutional care, needs professional back-up support on a twenty-four hour
basis, seven days a week.

Presently this is not available, and neither

is there any specialist termi na 1 care team avail ab 1e.

Most care of the

dying is done by relatives and generalist community nurses.
(79)
(80)

Dorgan and Myers, op.cit., note 76, pp.73-74.
Ibid., pp; 35' 54.

The only
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specialist oncology sisters in New South Wales are seven sisters in
the North Shore area of Sydney, one in Wollongong, and one attached
to the Royal Alexandra Hospital for Children, Sydney, all on a Monday
to Fri day basis.

The Seven Hills area has the only private pallia-

tive care unit in New South Wales, that of Mount Carmel, which extends
its services to the local corrrnunity. 81 Yet a little more corrununity
support would help many more stay at home longer, or even die at home.
There are, of course, many people who still believe that only
hospitals can offer quality care.

This., coupled with the widespread

traditional attitudes and expectations that death should occur in
hospital, encourages many to hospitalise their dying.

Many doctors

hold similar views and, as the end approaches, they recommend or even
insist at times, that the dying be admitted to an institution.

Dorgan

and Myers suggest that this may be the medical profession's way of
guarding against legal action against them after death. 82 It could
also be that they lack experience and confidence, or simply that they
do not wish to be disturbed by housecalls.
4.7.3

Alternatives
Some large city hospitals have recognised the need of special

expertise in terminal care and the special needs of the dying.

As a

response to it, they have established their own palliative care units
\

and some have even been able to form palliative care teams, manned by
those interested and/or experienced in the care of the dying.

Their

services, however, can only be offered on a limited scale, mainly to
cancer patients and usually their own patients. 83 Without specially
(81) Williams, .op.cit., note 35, July 19 and 20, 1983, p.9.
(82) · Dorgan and Myers, op. cit., note 79, p. 78.
(83) Williams, op.cit., note 35, July 20, 1983, p.9.

- 87 allocated funds, such efforts can only be limited, in spite of the
awareness of the need.

Continuing public pressure and media publi ci ty

is beginning to give results, the first such success being an oncology
sister to follow-up paediatric cancer cases at home, from the Royal
Alexandra Hospital for Children.
Another alternative, but very limited, is the choi ce for
hospice care.

Hospices are very few and the choice is only available

to a small number of people in capital cities.

There are presently six

hospices in New South Wales, all within. the Sydney Metropolitan area,
and they will only accept people who are in their last three months of
life.

Some offer day-care facilities at $90 a day, which is lower

than in-patient cost and which keeps the family at work while allowing
them involvement in the care of their dying .

The desired home care

hospice service remains a theoretical concept, since attempts to launch
it have failed because of lack of approval for funds. 84 , 85 Of course,
hospices do not exist in rural areas or in smaller cities, where the
hospital remains the primary choice, and often the only choice, if home
care can not be arranged or managed.
The most coITTTJonly chosen alternative remains the nursing home .
Within the Australian community, the prevailing attitude is that the
family s sense of obligation is discharged with placement.
1

This also

solves the problem of constant worry of what will happen to, and who
will look after the person needing care.

For many aged, however,

nursing home placement is viewed as a time to die, so that they cease
to be a constant problem and burden to the family, and of course many
(84)
(85)

Dorgan and Myers, op . cit., note 79, pp.62-63.
Williams, op .cit., note 35, July 19, 1983, p.9.
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Hinton quotes the

figure of 56 percent dying within a week of admission to homes for
terminal care, 86 in Britain.

4.8

CONCLUDING REMARKS
In a death-denying society, the more intensive caring needed

by the dying may not be at its best in hospitals catering for acute
cases, with the emphasis towards cure rather than care.

In hospitals,

family support suffers, corrmunications systems are misleading and the
dying are isolated at a time when they are most in need of human
presence.

Hospital carers deliver quite high technical care, but

neglect the patient's total needs.

These needs can be met equally

well in a hospice environment or at home, the patient having the final
choice.
The patient and relative carers need advice about the services
available and encouragement to use them.

They need to discuss alterna-

tives available to them regarding place of death.

Choices must be

discussed early to allow for planning and preparation.

To meet this,

health professionals must be aware of the available alternatives to
hospital death, and must be willing to discuss these with the patient
and family.
\

Home can provide a very secure, familiar and acceptable environment for the terminally ill patient and his family.
choosing home care impinge on many factors:
family;
members;
(.86)

Decisions for

on the willingness of the

the existence of and relationship with other available family
the available domiciliary support services;

Hinton, op.cit., note 9, pp.67-68.

and any other
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resources that the family can call upon or use for help.

The

patient 1 s condition, its treatment and side-effects and how these
impinge on family routine;
be obtained;

the means of pain relief and how they can

all these and many more factors will determine the out-

come.
Cost containment considerations are another impinging factor
on the care of the terminally ill.

Home care presents a very viable

economic alternative to institutional care, but it must remain as an
open alternative with the final choice resting with the patient and/or
his family.
choice.

Cost is only one criterion that may affect the final

Of course, unless Governments redistribute their money

allocations, to bring home support services on a twenty-four hour
basis, and to remove financial reimbursement incentives towards
institutionalised care, then the tendency for and choice of expensive
terminal care will continue, whether it is to the benefit of the dying
or not.

\

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1

CONCLUSION
The search for cures has been rewarded with a phenomenal

technological revolution in health care.

This expansion in medical

capabilities has added greatly to the possibilities for intervention
against disease, disability and even death.

The complexity of many

of these interventions, and their implications for the welfare of
individuals and of society as a whole have greatly complicated medical decision making.
The task of providing care for the dying has been largely
left to the medical profession, at least in industrial countries.
Medicine has been given the final authority in dealing with health,
illness and life.

Yet the medical profession as a whole has hardly

started to consider the question of the type of care which should be
provided for the dying.

That many doctors believe that the

presently-available care is good and all that is needed, does not
help matters.
The doctors are faced with a conflicting mandate between
curing and the use of scientific and technological developments for
prolonging life and that of caring and alleviating suffering in the
dying stage.

In the ever-increasing dimensions of intervention,

the tendency has been to uphold the former against the latter where
the two conflict.
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These days, the predominant number of deaths occur within
the hospital, the institution fundamentally committed to healing and
curing.

In the midst of the current technological emphasis on

healing, and because of the commitment to curing and the recovery
process, the incurable patient is perceived as a failure.

The commit-

ment to curing and the sense of failure act as the incentives and
impetus for the professional in mobilising all resources and employing
all known diagnostic and therapeutic means in an all-out effort to
avoid failure by delaying death.
becomes the norm.

Intervention at the terminal stage

Death has become something to be treated, inter-

fered with, technologically postponed.

It has become a technological

event.
Life-sustaining technologies, when used, challenge customary
definitions of death and render them insufficient.

As well, they

test many moral, social, legal and ethical issues and create conflict
between the individual's rights and desires and society's best
interests.
Medical and legal bodies at the national and international
level have been forced to re-examine the definitions and criteria
which determine death and to search for new ones in an attempt to
reduce legal complications.

Developments in organ transplantation

and the increasing number of patients now in hospitai\ maintained by
machines but with no hope of recovery, have acted as strong incentives for this re-examination process.
People ts concern about the way they may end their lives
and the fear of needless prolongation of dying and suffering has led
to these concerns being articulated through the euthanasia movement.
This movement is concerned with issues of voluntary euthanasia,
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patients' rights and the patient's ability to choose and direct what
technologies, if any, are to be used upon himself through his 'Living
Will'.

The movement works towards legislative changes to incorporate

a11 of these.
The acute hospital, with its emphasis on curing and on
delaying death, with its isolation, depersonalisation, technological
intrusion, unnecessary investigation and treatments, and the suffering
associated with all of these, is at odds with the needs of the dying
and can be counter-productive.

The dy.ing need more intensive caring

than intensive technical care, yet the hospital remains the only choice
for many.
In the health service, the dying (possibly because they do
not surviv_e to talk about their experiences and needs) and their care
have, to date, been given very low priority, both in terms of resources
allocated by health authoriti.es and large hospitals for facilities in
this area of care, and in the importance accorded to this care by
health professionals.
The increasing dissatisfaction with so much technological
intervention and technical care and yet so little concern for the
human being who is dying, and the failure of acute care institutions
to meet the needs of the dying, have led to the search for alternatives in the care of the dying.

\

Recently, escalating health care

costs are reinforcing this search for alternatives.
H~spices

and their holistic model of care, offer a viable

alternative for many patients, particularly those not wishing to die at
home, but also wishing to avoid hospitalised death.

The home hospice

teams make this form of care available to those cared for and dying
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at home.
seen

by

Hospice, as a new institution and form of care, has been
existing professionals as a threat, since it challenges

customary methods of care.
Home care is increasingly gaining prominence and acceptance
and is seen as a feasible, desired and equally effective alternative
to institutionalisation of the dying.

However, medicine has not been

geared towards home care so doctors need to re-orient themselves and
to regain the knowledge and expertise and confidence necessary for
supporting their patients at home.

Good knowledge of the available

community support services for home care is also essential.
While there is no conclusive evidence to suggest which is
the best place for the dying, the best place is the one which the
dying themselves choose, assuming that there is a choice possible and
that it is made among existing, real and viable alternatives.

In

Australia, such options and choices can only be made if the Government
gives serious consideration to the development of positive long-term
plans with specified objectives with a view to the general upgrading
of terminal care facilities and services.

Only then, with the devel-

opment of the present rudimentary services, could it be claimed that
the dying have any real options from which to choose.

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA

5.2

(1)

\

Consideration should be given by Government, health bodies
and health care professionals to the allocation of a
greater proportion of health resources towards increasing
and improving terminal care facilities and domiciliary
health services, particularly those support services
necessary for the home care of the dying.
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(2)

Greater priority should be given to improving and expanding
home support and home management of the dying by all health
care personnel.

(3)

Hospices, as alternatives to acute hospital care, should
become more prolific if a choice is to be made available
for the dying.

(4)

Palliative care units in hospitals should be supported to
expand their services so that not only patients in the unit
benefit, but al so home-manage·d pa ti en ts who may be given
the advantage of their expertise.

Palliative care teams,

based on a concept similar to that of the St. Thomas
Hospital in London, can greatly support the terminally ill
at home, as well as relieve expensive services.
(5)

Existing units for palliative care should be upgraded and
new ones created so as to meet the existing need for an
alternative.

(6)

Teams servicing the community should be increased to ensure
provision of care and support on a 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week basis.

Priority should be given to improving the

availability, supply and maintenance of equipment and
appliances necessary for managing home care and the dying
\

at home.
(7)

Evaluation of services by quality control and data collection is also necessary if the care and the needs of the
dying, so far badly neglected, are to be met.

APPENDICES

- 95 -

APPENDIX IA
THE ADVANCE DECLARATION OR 'LIVING WILL'

The advance declaration, or 'living will 1 as it i: ~ n own
widely in the United States, is designed to enable any citizen to
state clearly to his family and medical advisers that in the event of
his suffering any incurable and intolerable medical condition he
forbids the use of life-support that would in effect merely prolong
the act of dying, and requests, instead, adequate distress control
until natural death ensues.
The declaration can be helpful to a doctor who, faced with
a difficult decision regarding life-prolongation in the circumstances
specified, is thereby made aware of the considered conviction of his
patient expressed when in full possession of his faculties.
The declaration does not ask the doctor to do anything
contrary to existing law; indeed, what it asks of him is already
required of him by medical ethics, and under common law it is an
offence for a doctor to treat a patient against the latter's will.
Nevertheless the rights of patients ,are not adequately protected in
law, and the advance declaration is not yet backed by statute. It is,
therefore, of persuasive force only and is not legally binding on the
doctor, even though one would hope he would consider it morally
binding.
When the declaration is backed by statute the declarant may
direct, not merely request, his desired treatment. Statutory backing
for similar declarations has been enacted in a dozen American states
and, at the time of writing, similar statutes are before the South
Australian and Victorian parliaments awaiting approval. Enquiries
about the current state of the law in Australian states should be
directed to the address below.
**********
- The declaration form should be witnessed by two persons who should
not be relatives or have any expectation of material gain from the
estate of the declarant.
\
- One copy should be given to the doctor to be kept with the
declarant's medical records.
- Another copy should be kept with the declarant's personal ~ape~s,
or given to his solici.tor or other personal agent to act 1n his
interest in time of need.
- The yellow card should be kept by the declarant on h~s person, or,
if he is hospitalized, affixed to the bedhead where 1t can be seen
by all medical staff.
- Extra copies of the declaration and card are available on request.
**********
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If you would like to know more about V.E.S.V.'s work for
patients' rights and for good and responsible dying, or if you would
like to become a member and participate in that work, please contact:

THE VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA SOCIETY OF VICTORIA
P.O. Box 71, Mooroolbark, 3138. Phone:818 1245

'·
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THE 'LIVING WILL'

TO MY FAMILY AND MY PHYSICIAN
This statement is made by me

---rruTT-name-ana-aaaressJ ___ _
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\

at a time when I am of sound mind and after careful consideration.
If the time co~es when I can no longer take part in decisions for my own future, let this Statement stand as the testament to
my wishes:

If there is no reasonable prospect of my recovery from
physical or mental illness or impairment expected to cause me severe
distress or to render me incapable of rational existence, I request
that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by artificial means
and that I receive whatever quantity of drugs may be required to keep
me free from pain or distress even if the moment of death is hastened.

Signed ------------------------------------Dated
Witnessed by:
1.

2.

of

Of

NOTE:

Witnesses should not be members of the family.
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THE 'LIVING WILL' IN CARD FORM
(Side 1)
Name

--------------------------------------------Address
------------------------------------------

Phone No.
My Doctor is

------------------------------------------ P.T.O.
(Side 2)
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
Should I be unable to communicate, please note
that I have signed, in the presence of two witnesses,
the following Declaration:
If the time comes when I can no longer take part
in decisions for my own future, let this Declaration
stand as the testament to my wishes.
If there is no reasonable prospect of my recovery
from physical or mental illness or impairment expected
to cause me severe distress or to render me incapable
of rational existence, I request that I be allowed to
die and not be kept alive by artificial means and that
I receive whatever quantity of drugs may be required
to keep me FREE from pain or distress even\ if the
moment of death is hastened.
Date

Signed
P. T.O.

Issued by:

The Voluntary Euthanasia Society of Victoria
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APPENDIX 18
EUTHANASIA EDUCATIONAL COUNCIL

TO MAKE BEST USE OF YOUR LIVING WILL
\

1.

Sign and date before two witnesses.
(This is to insure that you signed of
your own free will and not under any
pressure.)

2.

If you have a doctor, give him a copy
for your medical file and discuss it
with him to make sure he is in agreement.
Give copies to those most likely to be
concerned "if the time comes when you
can no longer take part in decisions
for your own future".
Enter their
names on bottom line of the Living Will.
Keep the original nearby, easily and
readily available.

3.

Above all discuss your intentions with
those closest to you, NOW.

4.

It is a good idea to look over your Living
Will cince a year and redate it and initial
the new date to make it clear that your
wishes are unchanged.

18th printing
Revised April 1974
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TO MY FAMILY, MY PHYSICIAN, MY LAWYER, MY CLERGYMAN
TO ANY MEDICAL FACILITY IN WHOSE CARE I HAPPEN TO BE
TO ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO MAY BECOME RESPONSIBLE FOR MY HEALTH,
WELFARE OR AFFAIRS

old

a~e

Death is as much a reality as birth, growth, maturity and
- \ it is the one certainty of life.
If the time comes when I,

--------------------------------------------------------------------can no longer take part in decisions for my own future, let this
statement stand as an expression of my wishes, while I am still of
sound mind.

If the situation should arise in which there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery from physical or mental disability, I
request that I be a11 owed to die and not be kept alive by a rti fi ci a1
means or "heroic measures".
I do not fear death itself as much as
the indignities of deterioration, dependence and hopeless pain.
I,
therefore, ask that medication be mercifully administered to me to
alleviate suffering even though this may hasten the moment of death.
This request is made after careful consideration. I hope
you who care for me will feel morally bound to follow its mandate.
I recognize that this appears to place a heavy responsibility upon
you, but it is with the intention of relieving you of such responsibility and of placing it upon myself in accordance with my strong
convictions, that this statement is made.
Date

Signed

Witness

Witness

Copies of this request have been given to

There is NO p. 101 in original thesis
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APPEND! X 2
UNIFORM DONOR CARD
AUSTRALIAN KIDNEY FOUNDATION

UNIFORM DONOR CARD
OF__ _
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APPENDIX 3
PATIENTS RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1

The Medical Consumers' Association of NSW appreciates the opportunity
of making this document available to you.
As the consumer YOU are the person who is really responsible
for making decisions about your own health care. The Charter below is
designed to help you obtain the relevant infonnation to enable you to
make informed decisions.

A.
1.

These are already your Legal rights:
Right to a clear, concise explanation in lay person's terms
of your condition, problems or d1sease.

2.

Right to a clear, concise explanation in lay person's terms
of all proposed procedures and possible alternatives. The
explanation should include infonnation about the risk of any
side- or after-effects, problems relating to recuperation
and possibility of success, risk of death and whether such
procedures or treatments are of an experimental nature.

3.

Right to seek 'alternative health care' and to receive such
care from any person competent to provide it. 'Alternative
health care' includes acupuncture, chiropractice, herbalism,
homeopathic, hypnotherapy, naturopathy, osteopathy and the
like.

4.

Right to obtain the professional opinions of anyone of your
choice at any stage of the health care progralTITie. You also
have the right to know the identity and professional status
and qualification of those providing health services.

5.

Right to refuse any specific treatment, drug, examination or
other health care procedure, and you must not be subjected to
procedures or treatments without your competent and understanding, voluntary consent.

6.

Right to change your mind and refuse treatmen~s even if you
have previously agreed to them. But you should think carefully before you change your mind.

7.

Right, even without asking, to be informed about, a~d to
refuse to participate in, any research and/or experimental
procedures which use you.

8.

Right to have your case-history kept confidential, except
where you consent to have such information divulged or
where it is required by law to be divulged.

9.

Right to receive itemised details of the total, final account
for services rendered, regardless of the source of payment.
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Right to leave the health care facility regardless of your
physical condition or financial status. You may be requested
to sign a release, stating that you are leaving against the
medical judgement of your doctor or hospital, but there is no
legal compulsion to sign it.
Exceptions to the right to
discharge yourself may occur if an infectious disease has been
diagnosed, or if you have been certified as mentally ill.

11.

Right to compensation for injuries or illness incurred in
hospital care facilities or aggravated by the health therapist.

12.

Right to expect adequate instructions about how to look after
yourself when you are discharged from hospital~

13.

Right to refuse examination, treatment or observation by or
in the presence of, medical students. You may also refuse to
see an outsider who wishes to visit you. Exceptions may occur
when police are investigating criminal cases. In this
instance, permission to interview should have to be obtained
from the resident medical officer.

THE MEDICAL CONSUMERS 1 ASSOCIATION BELIEVES YOU SHOULD ALSO HAVE THE
RIGHT TO:
14.

Be treated in a humane manner, with considerate and respectful
care.

15.

Prompt and appropriate treatment, according to health needs.

16.

The highest standard of health care, regardless of source of
payment, social status, age, sex, race, religion or political
beliefs.

17.

Be informed about the facilities available for your own
specific requirements.

18.

Nominate a medical practitioner of your own choice to obtain
access to all medical records about your own care and to
inform you of what they contain.

19.

Access to people outside the health care facility (by means
of visitors and telephone).
Parents should \be a_ble to stay
with their children and relatives should be able to stay with
terminally ill patients 24 hours a day.

20.

A qualified interpreter if you cannot speak or understand
English.

21.

Nominate a friend, advocate or representative to join you and
your health therapist in making decisions.

22.

Be consulted before decisions are made to transfer you to any
other health facility.

23.

You should have the right to die with dignity.
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Patients' courtesies and responsibilities.

If you are in need of health care you should, in your own interest :
1.

Seek information as to your rights and see that your rights
are satisfactorily applied.

2.

Ensure that you have understood the purpose of all tests,
treatments or other procedures, the reasons for them and
possible alternatives before agreeing to them.

3.

Ta~e

4.

Know your own and your family's medical history.

5.

Keep appointments, or inform those concerned of your intention not to do so.

6.

Comply with treatment, or inform the therapist of your
intention not to do so.

7.

Accept the consequences of your own informed decisions, and
not change your mind about treatment without good reason.

responsibility for postponing, terminating or continuing

part or all of the proposed healthcare programme, including
operations. You should insist upon explanations until you
feel suitably informed and should consult with all relevant
persons before reaching a decision.

Compiled and published by the Medical Consumers' Association
of New South Wales, March 1978.

Source:

Maher, L., "The rights of patients", The
November 1980, pp.11-14.

Lamp,

Vol.37,
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APPENDIX 4
TABLE A4.1
TABLE OF MEAN TOTAL COST IN DOLLARS OF HOME AND HOSPITAL
CARE FOR THE FINAL TWO WEEKS OF LIFE BY EXPENDITURE
CATEGORY - AS REPORTED BY BLOOM AND KISSI CK

\
Room
Physician
Nurse
Home Aide
Pharmacy
Laboratory
Diagnostic X-Ray
Therapeutic X-Ray
Physical Therapy
Res.piratory Therapy
Blood
Supplies.
Equi.pment Rental
Work Loss.
All Other
Mean Total
Source:

Home

Hos pi ta 1

$

$

17
192

138
38
5

2711
280

876
811

223
30

120
428

309
53

222

32
78

33

170

586

6180

Kingsbury, K. I Want to Die at Home.
Heidelberg, 1980, p.63.
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In this study, the mean cost of personal medical care was
calculated to be for:
Hospitalised
Patients

Diagnostic tests 3 accounted for
Palliative care 4 costs accounted for
Loss af il\come was only recorded for
home care at $78 and was considered
an important cost
Nursing care was the highest expense
for home care
Doctor's charges were at a low

$2,886 1
18.7% *
28.6%

Home Care
Patients
$347 2
< 1% *
11.9%
13.3%
56.3%
2.9%

The above are some of the cost comparisons of hospital versus home
care.

K~:

1

This included physician charges.

2

This included charges for physician, home nurse
home health aide and homemaker.

3

These included laboratory tests, radiology
examinations, and other tests.

4

Palliative care costs included radiation therapy,
pharmaceuticals and equipment rental.

* Percentages are those of the total cost of care
in each category.
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